World Leadership Begins at Home

July 7, 1953 25c

George F. Kennan on *Russia: What Next?*

The Reporter



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

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

THE REPORTER'S NOTES

Tribute to the U.N.

While the bloody phase of the Korean conflict is coming to a close, now is the time to recognize the lesson of this horrible experience. That the war there was kept a limited one was due to a considerable extent to the fact that it was a U.N. war. The U.S. and South Korean forces had to bear most of the losses, yet enough Commonwealth and Turkish and Filipino soldiers died on the field to give the U.N. emblem more than a symbolic, ceremonial character. Our U.N. allies may or may not have been adequately consulted, but certainly they exerted a constant and wholesome check on the decisions of our political leaders.

This check hurt the feelings and the pride of our people. A war which the U.N. took on to deprive the North Koreans of the fruits of aggression had to find its end not in victory but in some sort of substitute for victory. For a nation like ours, which had fought its last two wars to total victory over powerful enemies, it was extremely hard to accept the fact that a war could end in a long-drawn-out, seemingly inconclusive stalemate.

Yet there was no other possible end, for the two halves of the world that faced each other in Korea are at best stalemated everywhere. Peace, we assume, can come only from the recognition of this fact and from the determination of both sides to continue the struggle with political rather than with military means. The President was quite clear on this point in his letter to Syngman Rhee.

We would like to add a kind word for this old man, for he never made a mystery of how he abhorred a peace that would keep Korea divided. He must have been thoroughly bewildered when Senator Knowland asked him to act as President Eisenhower wanted, for Dr. Rhee probably knew that a few days earlier the Senator had said that the truce which was being negotiated in Panmunjom was not a peace with honor.

Yet we understand Senator Knowland's change of opinion and we congratulate him for having made it. For there is something which may be called the public opinion of mankind which made itself felt and which even the most pro-Rhee Senators could not ignore.

THERE still can be limited wars in our world, just as there is crime in our society that law-enforcement agencies keep in check. But there cannot be total victory except at the price of total war. This mankind does not want, and the voice of mankind is so powerful that it can make itself heard even through so frail an institution as the U.N.

Five Years Ago in Prague

Pessimistic as we we were about the prospects of the Italian elections, we must admit that the results proved to be worse than our fears. It is clear now that over half of the Italian voters disapprove of Italy's past foreign policy. Half of the Italian people have shown that they are more interested in bread and work than in the Atlantic pact. No serious contribution can be expected from Italy to the new institutions of European or Atlantic democracy until the Italian democrats find the way to strengthen their own institutions at home.

The search for such a way presents extraordinary, possibly insurmountable difficulties even for the most skillful and respected among the Italian democrats, Alcide De Gasperi. Actually, he has no majority in either house of parliament, for the minor parties that formed the Center coalition during the campaign are either hesitant or unwilling to share the responsibility of government with De Gasperi's Christian Democrats. Moreover, De Gasperi's hold over his own party is far from secure.

There was a time when a triumvirate—Schuman, De Gasperi, Adenauer—was leading Europe toward unity, strength, and a more equitable distribution of wealth. Some months ago, Schuman was retired from the leadership in French foreign policy; Adenauer is now faced by ever-mounting domestic and international difficulties; and De Gasperi's leadership has been perhaps irreparably shaken.

The American press grossly misinterpreted the returns of the Italian election by overstressing the increase of the rightist vote. A misleading comparison was made with the votes that the Monarchists and neo-Fascists received in the 1948 elections, when both of these parties were still in their infancy. Actually the appeal of the neo-Fascist party has declined in recent times: from 6.88 per cent of the electorate in the 1951-1952 municipal elections to 5.83 in 1953. The Monarchist vote, while still increasing, is still less than the total of the three minor Center parties. In Naples, where Lauro, the Monarchist leader, is mayor, the people found his performance so convincing that his party's vote has dropped thirteen per cent since last year.

Yet it is exactly to Lauro and his party that De Gasperi is now urged to turn. The urging is done by the

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most conservative Christian Democrats and by some influential non-Italians. This in spite of the fact that the price Lauro would ask is certainly not in line with American interests. Lauro's own paper in a recent statement said: "The whole Italian foreign policy since the war, specifically in Italo-American relations, represents the worst chapter in recent Italian history, worse than the defeat itself, characterized by servility, stupidity, prejudice, and blindness."

It must be added, however, that the heart of Lauro and his Monarchists is set, rather than on foreign affairs, on more immediate domestic goals, like stopping the land reforms, easing taxes, and improving the lot of the privileged classes. These are things about which the Monarchists care even more than the return of the King, for they are economic rather than dynastic royalists.

THE thunderous news of the Italian elections does not come from the Right but from the Left. In the successive elections of 1948, 1951-1952, and 1953, the Communists and Nenni Socialists have moved on from 31.0 to 33.1 to 35.3 per cent of the popular vote. There has been no rollback or even containment of Communism in Italy.

Communists and fellow travelers have suddenly been taken by an extraordinary nostalgia for the good old days of "popular-front" coalition Governments. After the war, the experiment of democracy with Communist participation ended in the East with the tragic farce of the People's Democracy. In the West, the defense of freedom made it imperative that the Communists and fellow travelers be thrown out. The coalition idea seemed to have reached its irrevocable end when Jan Masaryk fell from the window five years ago in Prague.

"Seemed," we say, for Communists and fellow travelers, who are at it again, have quite a chance to reach their goal, at least in some nations. In Italy, for instance, where their power has been steadily growing and where even their archenemies, the Saragat Socialists, are willing to have another try at a popular front. Or in France, where experience has taught the Socialists that it pays to stay out of the Government alongside the Communist Opposition. There are signs that there too the Socialists are tempted to share the responsibility of government with the Communists. If the Kremlin goes on with its alleged policy of de-Sovietizing East Germany, it is quite conceivable that a provisional coalition Government, with representatives of the democratic West and of the Communist East, might be set up to prepare nation-wide elections in Germany.

THESE are actual possibilities, and they are to an extraordinary degree the concern of the American people. The Atlantic alliance is being undermined in its most vital sector: in the nations that are exposed to the brunt of a Russian aggression. Our government certainly has a minimum of influence over the democratic forces in Allied countries, while the Kremlin has the power to do what it pleases with the Communists everywhere – including selling them down the river.

But if the Russians have decided to further their purposes by using diplomacy and internal politics rather than war or the threat of war, then our government should have some countermoves ready. Now that the Russians have started stealing the "liberation" policy from the Eisenhower Administration, we should be ready to push them along that road. Our government, for instance, could ask that not only in East Germany but in every eastern European country genuinely free elections be held. We know much better than in 1945-1946 what the Communists are up to, so we should be much better prepared to define our own guarantees for free elections. Moreover, we should count on what the people of eastern Europe have got to say. If we are to go back to Potsdam, as the new Russian leaders desire, the internal politics of the European countries, East and West, can well become the object of Allied-Soviet negotiation.

WE ARE FACED with the need of thoroughly reshaping our foreign policy—if only because we realize how great and immediate our peril is.

We have waited for such a warning to come from our President. Recently, we heard him say at Mount Rushmore that everything is going just fine.

Backward, Turn Backward . . .

At a national conference on Federal-state relations held on June 10 by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the following suggestions were made from the floor:

1. Enjoin the states to refuse Federal grants.
2. Urge the opening of welfare rolls to public inspection.
3. End Federal Old Age assistance.
4. Strengthen the fiber of the family and look to the family to take care of the welfare problem.
5. Amend the Constitution so as to strike out the welfare clause.

The last of these ideas was presented by a Republican Congressman. It was greeted, we are reliably informed, by a generous scattering of applause.

EVEREST

London Times, *June 8*: *"As often in great expeditions, the scene fell short of expectations. . . ."*

And so, beekeeper and guide, they touched the sky,
Straddled the ridge of the world, ate cake, and prayed,
Looked down and found the view monotonous:
They were too high.

And so it seems to happen. When mortal eyes
Lift to the hills they see the vision there
And when they attain it, turning down their gaze,
The vision dies.

—SEC

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CORRESPONDENCE

AN OPINION FROM KOREA

To the Editor: In the Korean Edition of the *Stars and Stripes* dated May 28, 1953, Senator Taft urges the United States to avoid negotiating through the United Nations and form our own policy regarding the Korean action and the truce talks.

As a volunteer member of the Armed Forces, currently sitting on an outpost within a few hundred yards of Chinese and North Korean gunfire, I would like to register a protest.

All the enlisted men and officers, American and foreign, with whom I have talked since my arrival in the Far East have protested violently against being involved with an enemy in Korea; they find the war a stalemate and the territory of little value for their countries. But they have all voiced their willingness to back the United Nations' courageous effort to stop aggression wherever it occurs in the world. And these same people are willing to abide by the United Nations' truce.

If it is not for the United Nations, with its challenging program of "one worldness," to bring to an end once and for all the pettiness of individual nations, I would like to ask Senator Taft what he thinks we are fighting for.

The hope the United Nations offers is one of the few great sustaining forces, if not the last, in the western world.

GEORGE APPLEGATE
Lieutenant, Infantry

REACTIONS FROM NEVADA

To the Editor: The viewpoints expressed in the Mechling story ("I Battled McCarran's Machine," by Tom Mechling, *The Reporter*, June 9) and the Greenspun-McCarran feud ("Of Gamblers, a Senator, and a *Sun* That Wouldn't Set," by Richard Donovan and Douglass Cater, same issue) are in my opinion humorously biased.

Mechling makes quite a hero of himself with his story of how he dared to fight against the great McCarran. He overlooks the fact that in every campaign in the last twenty-five years, somebody was fighting the great McCarran, and many of them a good deal more effectively than young Tom. Unfortunately, young Tom did stir up enough venom during the primary to knock off one of Nevada's most able and capable young men in the person of Alan Bible. Bible's only sin was that he had Pat's support. Why Nevada Democrats voted for the unknown and undistinguished Mechling rather than for their own brilliant native son is one of the mysteries of politics.

Young Tom won the primary on the old tried and true theory that a handshake is a more powerful political tool than is the proven ability to handle the job. Tom brought no qualifications except a desire to sit in the U.S. Senate, which is a very nice ambition for any young man to have. He picked Nevada because he figured rightly that he would have a chance to shake hands with almost every voter in the state. He had no reason to offer why anyone should vote for him except a sort of vague New Deal philosophy of government and a repetitious attack on "machine politics." Enough people were flattered by his handshake to vote him in on the primary. Young Alan Bible refused to believe that people would vote for a perfect stranger to represent Nevada in the U.S. Senate, and made no campaign.

When the general election came around, Tom faced "Molly" Malone, who could have been unseated easily by any of a dozen good Democrats in the state. Molly is a good thinker and has a fine record of service to the State of Nevada. But his greatest political victory was always by the scantiest of margins in this normally Democratic state. It took a good deal of courage for Pat McCarran to swallow his distaste for Molly and get behind him. But the prospect of having the state represented by a man who had never lived in Nevada, whose support seemed to come from newspapermen like Drew Pearson, was too much. Pat swallowed his pride and urged his friends to vote for the lesser of two evils—Molly Malone.

The State of Nevada, which might have been represented in the Senate by the gifted Alan Bible, was the loser.

Young Tom may settle down in the state and some time may earn the right to the highest political office we have to give. We hope he does. After he lives among us for a few years, we may find that he has abilities and character that will entitle him to our support. But so far we have to regard him as a political adventurer who knows nothing of our state or its problems.

The Greenspun story was also interesting. Hank Greenspun, who is a very dear personal friend of mine, bought a newspaper and had to make it go. The best way to get a newspaper read is to have a big fight. Everyone loves a fight. And the surest way to be a hero is to look around the crowd for the biggest and toughest guy in sight and then walk up and punch the big fellow on the kisser. It is true that you take the chance of getting your ears beat off when you attempt such methods of gaining fame, because the big tough guy often is really big and tough and courageous and able to fight. Such a one is Uncle Pat. The grand jury is at present turning Hank upon its fiery spit over another episode wherein the irrepressible Hank is alleged to have committed libel on a powerful city politician.

Hank is a young man of spirit, and in the years to come he will be a power in the press. His opponent, the aging and venerable Senator, is also a man of stature and high accomplishment. No single living person has done so much for the State of Nevada as Senator Pat. They talk glibly about his machine. He has one. It is made up of literally hundreds of Nevada people who will do their best to keep Pat in the Senate as long as he is alive. For a quarter of a century his silver hair and silver tongue have given the state able and distinguished leadership in Washington. Seniority has added that power over committees without which a Senator is little more than an errand boy.

Senator McCarran is a true politician. He punishes his enemies without a qualm and rewards his friends to the best of his ability. When the state needs anything done in Washington, Pat has the horse-trading ability to get it done. It is sad that age and Father Time relentlessly take away from us those splendid men whose words flow in natural eloquence and who, by their ability to lead, rise to the heights of statesmanship. The little men who yelp at their heels merely add to the dignity of men like McCarran. Like the great antlered stag of the forest, Pat McCarran is beset by lesser creatures who bark and yap, but who could no more take the place of the stag than could Booth replace Lincoln.

Anyhow, we appreciate the attention you have given our state. Your article on the gambling situation ("Las Vegas: The Sucker and the Almost-Even Break," by William S. Fairfield, same issue) was fair, and shows that a keen analyst did your reporting. Please enter my subscription to *The Reporter*.

THOMAS E. TANEY
Las Vegas

To the Editor: William S. Fairfield's article on Las Vegas is one of the least sensational and least smart-alecky of any I have read. The accuracy of the matters I am acquainted with is also beyond reproach.

We would like to use the cover picture of Las Vegas by John Ployardt to copy on postcards.

ROBERT VAN SANTEN
Manager, Fortune Club
Las Vegas

KIND WORDS FROM OSLO

To the Editor: When I visited the United States in 1950, after an absence of nearly thirty-five years, I searched in vain for some of the outstanding media of public opinion that had filled the leisure hours of my youth (I lived there for nine years, 1906-1915).

I now hail *The Reporter* as a document proving that McCarthyism has not totally wiped out the liberty of the press in a country to which we, on this side, will always look for encouragement to carry on the struggle.

SVENE MORTENSEN
Oslo, Norway

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—HANNAH ARENDT

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

WHO— WHAT— WHY—

DEEPLY CONCERNED at the way foreign affairs are going, we at first intended to publish an article on the record established by Mr. Dulles so far. That record is less than brilliant, but in studying it we became convinced that it must be blamed not on Mr. Dulles alone, but on the White House, on Congress, and on a difficult world situation. That being the case, we were very fortunate in finding in **A. A. Berle, Jr.,** someone who felt as we did. Mr. Berle served as Assistant Secretary of State from 1938 to 1944. He was one of the principal authors of our Latin-American policy. Indeed, his last post in government was that of Ambassador to Brazil. His unusually wide experience in public affairs qualifies him to discuss that aspect of foreign-policy problems which shows itself in the actions taken officially by the State Department.

William Lee Miller, who teaches Christian Ethics at Yale University and edits the religious journal *Social Action,* considers various moral pronouncements made by the President as integral parts of his program during the campaign, when he laid so great a stress on religious themes. As a trained theologian, Mr. Miller seeks to establish with some degree of intellectual precision what the President's religious pronouncements really imply. Mr. Miller is a Presbyterian minister.

A third article, by our Washington Editor, **Douglass Cater,** reports on the recent activities of Senator Wiley, the man largely responsible for our foreign policy in the upper chamber.

THERE HAS recently been a spate of articles on Africa in the American press. For *The Reporter* Africa is no recent discovery; regularly, we have given considerable coverage to its problems. In our last issue we reported on Kenya; we now turn to Tunisia. Tunisia is something of a bellwether for the entire southern shore of the Mediterranean. There nationalism is acute and violence endemic; the reluctant French are driven to ineffectual concessions. There can be no easy solution to the Tunisian difficulty. But it is one that must be faced. **George H. Gerard,** as a correspondent for a number of news services, traveled a great deal last year in Egypt, the Levant, and North Africa, specializing in the affairs of the Mediterranean littoral. Mr. Gerard's approach is a balanced one. It is neither all out against colonialism nor a blanket endorsement of the French government's attitude. Tunisia is a vital spot in the Mediterranean and its claim to independence must be considered—along with the broad interests of security in the whole region.

Now that the Russians are making a new bid to the West Germans, it is useful to examine a trend which has long existed in German diplomacy. For many years now, despite all changes in the situation, there have been Germans—by no means Communists—who have persistently sought to establish an alliance with Soviet Russia. **Theodore Draper** tells the story of a man who spent a lifetime seeking to promote such an alliance. The case of Herr Nadolny is particularly interesting in that it encompasses such a long period of time and typifies such an unwavering purpose. Mr. Draper made a trip to Germany for *The Reporter* in 1949-1950, just when Nadolny was last in the news. A portion of the present article is based on information Mr. Draper gained during this period.

The Congressional economy drive on service expenditures has been much in the press lately. We shall not enter into the battleground of interservice arguments, but for some reason the Army seems to be by far the easiest Congressional target. Perhaps this is because it is the oldest and biggest branch of the armed forces. **Milton Lehman,** who writes the article on Army waste, was a reporter on *Stars and Stripes* and a combat correspondent in Africa, Sicily, Italy, and France. He covered the fighting on the Anzio beachhead and won the Legion of Merit for getting out the first edition of *Stars and Stripes* in Rome on the first day our forces entered the city.

WHEN Max Ascoli traveled in Europe this spring, one of the French statesmen he sought out and talked with was **Guy Mollet,** secretary-general of the French Socialist Party. He was particularly interested in M. Mollet because of the latter's key position in French politics, and later obtained the article in this issue defining the Socialist position on European unity.

The day **Naomi Barko,** a former staff member of *The Reporter,* came to see us with her article on men's magazines, she inquired anxiously whether we thought her coverage of the field was complete. She hoped it was, because she felt rather appalled at the prospect of our asking her to read any more of this literature than she already had read.

Regular readers of *The Reporter* already have a head start on Isaac Deutscher's compact book *Russia, What Next?,* for they will have seen Mr. Deutscher's analysis of Stalin's legacies and heirs in our April 14 issue. Mr. Deutscher's book is reviewed by **George F. Kennan,** former Ambassador to the Soviet Union. We are happy to have Isaac Deutscher writing for us regularly on Russian affairs; we are singularly happy to have Mr. Deutscher's opinions analyzed and criticized by Mr. Kennan. Our readers can profit from such a discussion between experts. Mr. Kennan has outstanding qualifications to comment on what goes on in the Kremlin. This is the first time Mr. Kennan has ever reviewed a book on Russia. After twenty-seven years in the Foreign Service, Mr. Kennan is retiring to resume his work as a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton.

OUR May 26 issue presented some striking facts and figures on Soviet economic growth, and the dangers and troubles for us which it may present. This crucial subject was discussed at a special conference of experts held in Arden House, Harriman, New York, in May, 1952. Naturally, as one of the experts, **Harry Schwartz** of the New York *Times* was there, too; he now gives a report on the findings of the meeting. An economist before he was a journalist, Mr. Schwartz has written three books on the economy of the Soviet Union.

In this issue **Marya Mannes,** in the first of a series of articles, takes up one of the most deeply important subjects in the field of communication: the performance, for good or evil, of the men who furnish America with the news over the air. A great many more people than ever before get all their information by radio or TV, and base their judgments on what they hear or see rather than on what they read. How has TV—with all its technical possibilities—been faring so far in competition with radio?

Our cover for this issue was painted by **Paul Arlt,** who will be remembered for the scene in Moscow's Red Square that he did at the time of Stalin's death. Mr. Arlt draws political cartoons for the New York *Herald Tribune.*

IN OUR NEXT ISSUE we present an analysis of how the Voice of America and the United States Information Service have been wrecked by Congressional investigations. Some of our coverage will be provided by people who were directly involved.

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HARLAN CLEVELAND

Perspective and the Meat Ax

SELDOM has the attention of our Senate been so focused on foreign policy. Senators have been warning the President about how to behave in any future discussions on the recognition of Communist China and its membership in the United Nations. Senators are trying to fence in the President's treaty-making powers. Senators are mixing into the delicate, difficult, and secret negotiations with our Allies about the controls over shipments of strategic goods to the Soviet bloc.

It is a relief to see Congress finally tackle a piece of foreign-policy legislation put up to it by the President. The Mutual Security program is now traveling its tortuous annual course: authorization bills in the House and Senate, then another full round to consider the bill that carries the actual funds. At the appropriations stage, in the domain of Senator Styles Bridges and Representative John Taber, the danger is that it will be treated not as foreign policy but as an exercise in statesmanship by meat ax.

SOME OF THE CUTS in the Mutual Security request will be rationalized by straight economy talk, bolstered of course by the unspoken argument that it's better to cut off funds for foreigners, who don't vote in our elections, than for constituents. But some cuts are certain to be justified by bringing to life again two notions that have haunted the Mutual Security program before and are haunting it again this year.

One notion is that giving away things that shoot or explode (military aid) is fine, but giving away things that are eaten or worn or used in civilian factories (economic aid) is bad. Actually, of course, all aid is given for the same reason: because the country receiving it can't afford to get along without it, whether the aid is a jet fighter or a cargo of cotton. If we give our aid in the form of planes, France can take resources it might otherwise devote to making planes and devote them instead to making commercial trucks for economic growth or pleasure cars for a rising standard of living. If we decide to give our aid in the form of civilian goods, the French will be able to devote more resources to making their own military airplanes, which they are perfectly competent to do.

The central question about any proposed cut should be, not the dislike for one or another form of assistance, but whether the total amount of assistance is needed.

The other notion that has prevailed in past debates on aid is that it is unrighteous to go beyond the provision of "pure" technical assistance to less developed areas of the world. It would be nice if we could really have a vigorous foreign policy in Asia and Africa and keep it cheap; it would be nice if the Indians and Filipinos and South Koreans had all the resources they could use, and needed only advice on how to use them. But in their countries and some others, technical aid unaccompanied by vitally needed supplies cannot succeed in pushing economic development fast enough to keep moderate Governments in office.

This is why the President requested $288 million for "special economic assistance" to India, Pakistan, the Near East, and Africa, and put up to Congress separately a proposal to lend the Pakistani up to a million tons of wheat from our current surplus. This type of aid is a political must in our relations with Asia.

Dog-Eared Tag

The Mutual Security debate is an argument about the aid for next year. Unfortunately, our involvement with Mutual Security spans a much longer period than one year, and implies something more than just foreign aid. We shall never get away from this yearly ritual, in which foreign policy is made by cutting appropriations, until we make two changes in the way the problem is handled.

The first of these changes would be to lay out our aid programs for more than a year at a time. Most

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of the constructive tasks of American leadership in the world cannot sensibly be taken care of on a year-to-year basis. As things now stand, President Eisenhower and his associates cannot tell France whether we shall be buying airplanes in France next year; Messrs. Dulles and Stassen are stumped when Prime Minister Nehru asks them whether the United States will support India's five-year development plan with loans and technical aid; and the President cannot even pledge with certainty that we shall continue to aid South Korea.

Every effort since the Second World War to tackle one or another piece of our foreign economic problem has been labeled "interim," or "stopgap," or "emergency," or something of the kind. With the war now eight years behind us and the Mutual Security program now going into its third year and no end in sight, that dog-eared "temporary" tag is still in daily use on Capitol Hill. President Eisenhower and his Cabinet can, if they will, begin to stress right now that this is only the beginning of a new phase of sustained U. S. leadership in the world. Then, next year, the Administration will be able to come up with a long-range concept, an enduring framework of legislation to cover economic co-operation with our friends and Allies abroad, and the provision of funds for periods that better reflect the length of time required to get results in Europe's rearmament effort or the village-development work in India.

What Doesn't Exist

The second major change would be to establish institutions and procedures that would allow the Executive, Congress, and all concerned to look at our foreign economic policies as part of a single program and to relate them in a sensible manner to our domestic policies. Institutions of this type have already been set up to give a comprehensive view over two other complex and related fields.

To maintain full employment at home, the government has to look at its own domestic economic actions in relation to the actions of businessmen, workers, and farmers. That is why, in the Employment Act of 1946, Congress charged the President with making a full public report every year to a Joint Committee of Congress on the economic state of the union. For the first time, this law made it necessary to look at *all* the factors that affect the level of business activity in the United States. The Employment Act didn't work perfectly by any means, partly because of personality conflicts among the President's economists. But the idea is basically sound—as President Eisenhower, after a period of uncertainty, has recognized in proposing to re-establish the Council of Economic Advisers.

Another reviewing platform of a different sort is the National Security Council, a body that can look at our military plans and our foreign policy together. When it is working at its best, it provides the indispensable three-dimensional spectacles through which the President can view both diplomatic and strategic decisions in the perspective of the national interest.

The final platform needed is missing: one from which the interrelationships between our domestic economy and our foreign economic policies can be seen and acted upon. Primitive as are the techniques for drawing together the threads of full-employment policy or of national strategy, they are impressive when compared with what doesn't exist in the foreign economic field.

At present, decisions on trade and tariffs, aid, farm prices, foreign development loans, customs regulations, exchange rates, and U.S. government procurement actions are made in widely separated parts of the Executive Branch. Each operates under legislation that hardly recognizes the existence of the other issues. There is a most direct relationship, for instance, between an agricultural quota to exclude Danish cheese, a reciprocal trade agreement with Denmark, Denmark's need for defense-supporting aid, the need for an Export-Import loan to Denmark, and the U.S. Army's purchases of Danish butter and bacon for its forces in Germany. Yet there is no single place in the government where these matters are supposed to be considered in relation to one another.

If the President were to make a mandatory report to Congress at the beginning of each session, reviewing the relationship between foreign economies and our own, the improved understanding of the problem should certainly produce better co-ordinated acts by the Executive and better legislation. There would also be more public support for the foreign policies of the United States—and probably less aid, since our aid is in part the price we pay for high tariffs and other forms of economic nationalism.

MAYBE some day Congress will be persuaded to add to its kit of tools a good pair of stereoscopic binoculars, for looking well ahead and seeing several related programs at once. Then, perhaps, the task of legislating will become so absorbing that Senators won't have time to double as Secretaries of State.

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Secretary in Search Of a Foreign Policy



A. A. BERLE, JR.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS have been going badly for the Eisenhower Administration and for the United States. The western alliance against Russian aggression is clearly in a state of stress. It could break up. Nothing presently on the horizon suggests improvement unless some commanding force enters the situation. Finding or perhaps becoming that force is now of the first importance to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles if the community of free nations is to hold together.

The ordinary business of trained diplomats, like that of experienced politicians, is bargain and compromise. Yet every politician and every experienced practitioner of foreign affairs knows that at some point politics and diplomacy must express elemental idealistic concepts compelling the support of men and nations. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles have about reached that point if the western community is to be preserved.

IN COOL analysis, the situation is this: The United States, partly by its will and partly by sheer force of gravity, is the indispensable central force in a huge grouping of nations, all menaced by Russo-Chinese imperialism. Holding this group together, strengthening its lines, setting up a powerful moral, military, and political counterforce, and eventually converting Russia and China into peaceful powers must be the first task of America's policy both to defend itself and to establish peace in the world.

Splitting the Russian-Chinese aggressive combination and winning the border nations of Southeast Asia and the Near East is the top defensive problem of American diplomacy. Conversely, consolidation of the immense land mass from Germany to the Pacific is the first task of Russian foreign policy, just as seizing or dominating the border states and splitting the free-world coalition is the top job assigned to the Kremlin diplomats. For some time now the Kremlin, with the help of American nationalist politicians, has done rather better at splitting the free-world group than the United States has at unifying it, and so far as one can see Moscow's diplomacy has been at least as effective as ours in the border countries.

New Faces, Same Problems

We may omit faultfinding. The political forces dividing the free world certainly were not produced in the last five months. President Truman and Mr. Acheson had not solved the problem of holding France and Britain in firm alliance while retaining the good will of nationalisms like those of Iran and Egypt. The outgoing Democratic Administration had not been able to state a moral position on which Southeast Asian nations could find common ground and common interest with the United States. It had not yet convinced great masses of people in Italy, France, and Britain that peace was more likely to be maintained by a strong western community of nations than by Moscow.

So the crisis of 1953 would probably have come in any case. The Italian elections were bound to raise the question in the Mediterranean. The unwillingness of France to face the economic problem of its lower classes and the political problem of its unstable Ministries created a situation that could hardly have been postponed. Growing desire in Britain, fostered by Aneurin Bevan (in odd agreement with some of the extreme Tories), to break out the late Mr. Chamberlain's umbrella and strike a bargain with Moscow, in obstinate belief that a mere diplomatic reshuffle could bring peace, had to be coped with at some point.

CRUCIAL spot problems—the Korean War, Israel against the Arabs, Egypt against British control of Suez, Indo-Chinese independence aspirations against the French desire to preserve a measure of dominion, the unresolved problem of India's orientation, growing dissatisfaction in neglected Latin America—were all there last December, and all were due for airing this year. Add to these Germany's increasingly decisive continental weight, capable of adhering to the West through NATO and the European army or of crippling the West through neutralism and economic self-enrichment—not to mention several other assorted

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headaches—and few will blame Mr. Dulles if he has not yet found the answer.

In all these situations peoples and governments alike have expected an American answer. The writer believes they still expect it, though in frustration and disappointment many are asking to be let alone or to take their chances in a horrible game of Russian roulette. There is still recognition of American wealth and military power; there is still a deep and poignant yearning for some principle of common action and understanding in universal human terms. There is still the straining for peace. There is still a sense that the great concept by which the world may be rebuilt will come from America if it does not come from Moscow.

But because it has not been forthcoming, from all parts of the world reverberate echoes of doubt whether the United States as a nation, and the government that represents it, can state such a principle, can unify the American will in support of it, and can drive it through to unified international action.

Clearly any concept adequate to this crisis must far transcend both narrow nationalism and domestic partisanship, and necessarily it must be cast in terms directly excluding isolationism, xenophobia, or sectarianism. This is directly opposed to certain powerful political forces in this country dead set in the other direction and strong in Congress. As long as these forces seriously influence American policy, no adequate answer can be found. The first struggle to save the peace and defend a free world must be fought out in the United States.

Dulles's Hot Spot

For struggle it is, and until the Administration and the Department of State have met it and have won it, they cannot really attempt, let alone achieve, world leadership. Winged words scripted by public-relations men will never do this job. A spirit must be created commanding such popular support that American political processes will back the policy expressed and implied in it, and will make it effective as needed through Congressional action.

But at the moment the Republican Party is squarely divided between nationalists like Senators Bricker, Bridges, and Taft and internationalists like Senators Wiley, Ives, Saltonstall, and their friends. The truth to Senator Saltonstall is poison to Senator Bricker. The things President Eisenhower must say and Secretary Dulles must do to protect the country and save the great alliance are anathema to Senators McCarthy and Jenner. Thus far all attempts to hold together this impossible coalition have deprived President Eisenhower of the power to lead and Secretary Dulles of the power to act. Paralysis in this phase of foreign affairs means failure.

THIS IS hard on Secretary Dulles. Failure will be laid at his door, not at the Senators'. Yet a U.S. Secretary of State must at all times command a majority in Congress if he is to survive. Once he is defeated on a major measure, his position as negotiator or spokesman for the country is finished, and his pronouncements, like his agreements, though perhaps inspiring, are not national policy.

Faced with division in their own party, the President and Secretary Dulles have really had only two alternatives. They can seek compromise formulas in administration and policy—which they have done. This denatures doctrine and limits action. Or they can state their faith, take their stand, and stake their political lives at the cost of splitting their own party. Winning, they would be great national statesmen. Losing, they would be prisoners or functionaries of shifting groups in Congress. Thus far President Eisenhower has been unwilling to put his fortunes to this test, and Secretary Dulles has accepted the conclusion.



The basic lines run deeper than foreign policy. Because the McCarthy group made an issue of "loyalty," security people in the State Department, such as Scott McLeod, have pushed necessary check-up procedures to the point of questioning the eligibility of Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen for the Moscow appointment and more recently that of Mrs. Mildred McAfee Horton for a U.N. delegation post.

These celebrated cases are merely indicative of a large number of similar instances that have not been brought to public knowledge. Because of them, the caliber of persons ready to accept public appointment has been lowered. To anyone who has worked in foreign affairs during the past two decades, appointment to a foreign-affairs post means running the gantlet of a star-chamber trial. This is putting the police into politics with a vengeance—the precise thing J. Edgar Hoover has steadily and honorably refused to allow the FBI to do. The result may have satisfied some in Congress. It has angered everyone else.

The Disjointed Dogma

This weakness, which has endangered foreign policy, probably stems from the grass-roots base of the present Administration. It was to be a "businessman's government." Power was to go to the real backbone of America—the administrators of the great corporations. Many of these men had developed an almost instinctive dogma: Strong Federal government was thought dangerous. One hundred per cent American nationalism was believed the best criterion of action in foreign affairs. Economy and lower taxation were considered the primary domestic needs. Fighting Communists by investigations at home provided a good popular issue. Foreign support could be had by "selling America" through advertising methods.

The sheer and dangerous absurdity of promising peace in Korea while demanding conquest of Red China, of crying that Russian aggression must be stopped everywhere while insisting that arms appropriations be cut, of calling on Europe to follow our lead while we were refusing to take responsibilities there, had not—

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has not, even now—fully penetrated to the leaders of the Administration.

If all this were merely domestic politics, the results, however regrettable, might have no international implications. But abroad the extremist wing of the Republican Party squarely symbolizes the end of international co-operation. How could it be otherwise? The crypto-isolationist Republicans in Congress breathe brimstone against Russian aggression but advocate cuts in armament and foreign aid. Senator McCarthy wants a quarrel with Britain. Senator Bricker, in company with fifty-odd Senators, proposes amending the Constitution in a manner which virtually prevents the President and Secretary of State from making any international pledge of any kind. Still others carry on an almost open campaign against the United Nations. Foreign governments cannot be blamed for wondering who represents American thinking and who really formulates American policy.

Illustrations could be multiplied. The result is plain. Until the situation is resolved, the current erosion of the free-world community will continue. Meanwhile American power is in contact with and pitted against Soviet power in practically every part of the globe. Wherever American policy wobbles, there is always a Russian agent on the spot ready to act.

Until Secretary Dulles, or President Eisenhower on his behalf, can put the Department of State into a situation where it can act, semi-paralysis will rule, and the Russian diplomatic campaign to divide the West and take over the border countries will continue to progress.

The G.O.P.'s Responsibility

A solid moral problem first has to be faced. In the world of businessmen and bankers of which Secretary Dulles has been one of the great lawyers, it has been fashionable to decry the broad statements of President Franklin Roosevelt. Businessmen and bankers (rightly enough, in their affairs) do not usually deal in broad statements. Still less are they apt in knowledge of the impact of philosophical and spiritual forces and beliefs.

They have yet to learn that the broad international pronouncements of Mr. Roosevelt, like those of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson before him, were not campaign conversation. The "Good Neighbor" policy was an electric conception—and a spearhead of action. The Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms unified half the world against Nazi attack. To be able to make them, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull built a national and bipartisan sentiment and policy in foreign affairs by long, unflagging, patient work. Senator Vandenberg, a Michigan Republican, worked with Senator Connally, a Deep South Democrat; Senator Warren Austin, a conservative Vermont Republican, stood with Senator Wagner, a liberal New York Democrat; Mr. Dulles himself worked as Republican representative with both President Roosevelt and President Truman. The national policy of the time was the product not of accident but of ceaseless persuasion and work. On this foundation, America had an authentic voice.

So it seems Secretary Dulles now has the task of re-creating a unified opinion and true bipartisanship in the United States under the leadership of his President. But these must be achieved partly by conquest and partly by conversion, not by political bargains on policy or compromised departmental administration.



Because the Administration is Republican, that party bears primary responsibility for providing a preponderance of public opinion and a Congressional majority enabling the President and his Secretary of State to act, just as the President and Mr. Dulles have primary responsibility for leading their party into unified and responsive action.

THE Democratic Opposition draws no "pass" in this test of American democracy. Democratic leaders, to their credit, have refrained from carping criticism. They have commonly voted with the President on international matters. Quite probably they have done so with the usual political feeling that the President and the Department of State, after receiving their votes, must take full responsibility in the next election for any resulting failure of policy.

This is good negative tactics—but it is not good enough. When Cordell Hull appealed to Arthur Vandenberg, he was not asking for tacit acquiescence. He was asking the dynamism of his positive leadership in the country's interest—and he got it. When the writer appealed to Senator Warren Austin to support the inter-American defense system, Senator Austin's voice and moral courage were needed even more than his vote; and Austin stumped the country from Vermont to California in behalf of the system which President Eisenhower has now inherited. Statesmanship and solid Americanism may be asked from, or must be volunteered by, the responsible Democratic leaders in the Congress and in the country. This is no time for any smug hope that the Administration in power will suffer international disaster for the benefit of the Democratic Party in 1956.

The Penalty: Isolation

President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles must find and state the picture of the world they seek to organize. They must follow up with the measures they now need to meet their current problems. They must convert or defeat extremists in both parties. They may have to fight through the ensuing controversy at

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every level. This is the price of representing the United States and the prerequisite to becoming world statesmen.

Unless a truly nonpartisan, mature, and determined United States policy is achieved, and unless the President and his Secretary of State can distill that unity into the dynamic idealism which is the real basis for any action, diplomatic or even military, the United States will end in isolation—of Russian design and for Russia's benefit. Until the domestic political contradictions are resolved, neither this nor any President of the United States, neither Mr. Dulles nor any Secretary of State, can unlock the almost limitless power of an American idealist conception. When these contradictions are resolved, America can give design and purpose to the whole free world, backed by the will and the power and the might of the United States. Once this is done, we shall almost certainly unlock a similar will and desire and power from Asia to mid-Europe; renewed hope will arise that the peace of peoples may be made real; and the community of free nations will begin to gather irresistible headway.

This means, to repeat, that men in the White House and the State Department will have to risk their political careers in their country's defense. If this appears to be asking much, let one thing be remembered: In every war we ever fought, we expected young Americans to risk their lives.

Senator in Search Of Leadership

DOUGLASS CATER

LAST MONTH, in the course of a lengthy, partially extemporaneous speech before a group in Washington, Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was heard to declare, among other things, that nowadays it is possible to cross the ocean in three hours, that only nine of the sixty raw materials vital to our defense output are to be found on this continent, and that Patrick Henry once said, "We must all hang together or we will hang separately."

The same afternoon a Washington newspaper announced that a squadron of B-47 jets had crossed the Atlantic in near-record time of five hours and fifty-three minutes. According to government experts, there are seventy-eight materials on the strategic list and we are relatively self-sufficient in seventeen. Finally, according to *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*, Benjamin Franklin, not Patrick Henry, was the man who stressed the necessity of hanging together.

Now none of these minor errors detracted in the least from the fundamental point Senator Wiley was trying to make that afternoon, which was that he, Wiley, stood foursquare behind President Eisenhower in eschewing the "go it alone" views recently enunciated by Senator Robert Taft. This forthright pronouncement by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was duly noted by political observers seeking to assess the Administration's chances of buttressing its foreign policy in Congress. But neither could these same observers fail to note the imprecisions that attended the Senator's declaration.

As Senator Wiley goes about his foreign-policy chores, he cannot avoid being compared with the last two Chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg. Such comparisons are hard on Wiley. Connally, the courtly yet acid-tongued Texan, built a firm reputation for the insight that most people believed lay beneath his provincial wit, and was a man feared by those who did not respect him. Vandenberg of Michigan has, since his death, taken on giant stature in Senate legend. His words, written and spoken, have become a catechism for the more international-minded Republicans and Democrats alike.

WILEY has neither Connally's wit nor Vandenberg's eloquence. Just how much he shares the deeper understanding that these two are generally credited with having possessed is disputed even by those who know him best. One thing is evident: The lack of sensitivity to verbal precision can be a serious handicap to one so high in the ranks of those who make foreign policy.

When in January President Eisenhower announced the removal of the Seventh Fleet from patrol duties off the coast of China, Wiley promptly told reporters that the purpose of the action was to prepare the way for Nationalist bombing of railroad lines from Manchuria to Indo-China. When later interrogated by anxious fellow Senators, Wiley was obliged to admit that he had been talking off the cuff, with no precise knowledge of the Administration's intentions.

On February 9, after a conference

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with Secretary of State Dulles, Wiley was asked by newspapermen about the possibility of a blockade of the China coast. Wiley took the position that such questions were not really foreign-policy questions at all. "Every thinking person realizes we are at war," he said. "Being at war, the President is the Commander in Chief. In war, it is not generally a legislative function to determine which steps should be taken." For this seeming abdication of Congressional responsibility, he was editorially taken to task by the Washington *Post,* whose remarks concluded, "Surely a committee chairman who emerges from a consultation with the Secretary of State should learn to weigh his words."

In late April, when the Communist breakthrough in Indo-China was causing grave concern in Washington, Wiley popped off at a trade-association dinner in Chicago with the suggestion that "consideration should be given to turning over some midget A-bombs to the French."

Pellucid Moments

Those who are impressed mainly by such random salvos consider Wiley's accession to the Foreign Relations post a handicap of near-tragic proportions to the new Administration. Others are not willing to sell the paunchy Wisconsin Senator so short. It is not altogether fair, they argue, to compare him with Vandenberg. Despite the weighty thoughts and the studied phrases with which he dramatized his role, Vandenberg, they claim, was doing nothing more nor less than follow the course that most Americans did in the late war and postwar years.

Wiley, on the other hand, has no such easy role to play. Wisconsin today is quite a bit different from the Michigan of a few years ago. In case the senior Senator from Wisconsin should ever be inclined to forget this, there is the living presence of the junior Senator, Joseph McCarthy, to remind him.

This being so, Wiley's admirers claim that he has spoken out at times when saying the right thing required considerably more courage than discretion. They cite his speech at the American Society of Newspaper Editors convention on April 19, 1952, less than three months before the Republican Convention, which exploded like a smoke bomb among the swarming Republican diehards in Congress. Wiley not only commended the "constructive achievements" of U.S. foreign policy but gave a warm tribute to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was sharing the platform with him.

The fury of Senators Harry Cain, Karl Mundt, and Bourke B. Hickenlooper knew no bounds. For weeks following, Wiley had to engage in verbal duels with his tormentors.

But Wiley clung stubbornly to his views and a short time later directed an open letter to Senator Eugene Millikin, slated to become the Resolutions Committee chairman for the Republican National Convention, that stated ringingly: "I do not want to see the Republican Party surrender to a group of well-intentioned but apparently medieval-minded men who are living in the intellectual dark age. . . . I do not want to see the Republican Party delude the American people into thinking that by a wave of a magic wand, we can save billions of dollars overnight in



foreign aid. . . ." Some who contrast the hard decisions facing the Republican Administration today with the foreign-policy plank adopted at Chicago believe that Millikin and John Foster Dulles, the plank's chief draftsmen, might well have paid more attention to Wiley's views.

Wiley's detractors continue to maintain that such pronouncements, while revealing a degree of courage, cannot be taken as the true mark of the man. They point out that Wiley, unlike Vandenberg, has little aptitude for composing his own formal utterances, which are frequently prepared by a bright young assistant named Julius Cahn.

Raising the Standard

Much of the effect of a Wiley oration does not, however, depend on the prepared text. A good example was the address he gave to the American Association for the United Nations at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington not long ago. His topic was "What the Senate Can Do to Help America's Role of Leadership in the United Nations."

The Senator began at a rapid clip, face bent low over the copy, reading with little emphasis until he came to his first quotation: "We must," he said, "raise a standard to which the wise and honest may repair. . . ." Wiley paused, removed his dark hornrimmed glasses, gazed at the audience and said thoughtfully: ". . . the wise, not the vulgar. . . . For, as a great woman once said, 'The time for greatness has come.' " He paused awhile, then ducked his head again and hurried on until he came to a sentence proclaiming that "domestic affairs and foreign affairs have become indissolubly inter-twined." Whereupon he again paused, again gave the audience the benefit of his scrutiny, and, interlacing his fingers, held them up for all to see, almost shouting the words, "Just like this!"

As THE speech went along, Wiley's departures from the text became more and more frequent. A certain evangelical quality crept into his voice. Leadership, he maintained, was something which must stem from "a light from within." Toward the end, Wiley seemed to sense that he had not dealt very incisively with the topic at hand. He decided to try an anecdote. He recalled, he said, a conversation he once had with an elevator operator in San Francisco. Wiley had commented on the man's Italian accent, and the man had replied, "Thirty-five years ago I came to this country and landed at this port." And then, said Wiley, the elevator operator had added, "But *this* is my country." Again the spectacles came off, again

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the slow, intense gaze at the audience. The Senator's voice choked up, "Something just went up and down my spine," he said. "Here was a chap . . . [pause] . . . who had come from abroad . . . [long pause] . . . raised his family . . . children became dentists and lawyers. . . . This is my country, ah! . . . Yes, it's our country, my friends."

Wiley then thanked his listeners for their patience, remarking with a laugh, "It's the fellow that does the preaching who gets the most good out of the sermon," and headed for his chair.

WILEY often refers to the "inner light" that he believes must guide America's leaders in the conduct of foreign relations. By indirection, he has ascribed to it some of his own acts on the international stage that have particularly puzzled various foreign representatives.

Last fall, when he was a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly, Wiley delivered a major address attacking Soviet practices that were conducive to international tensions. The speech had been carefully prepared by State Department aides, but in his delivery the Senator followed his usual practice of extemporization, relying heavily on his evangelical powers of suasion and punctuating his remarks with appeals to the delegates to "Listen to me. This is important!" Several days later, Andrei Gromyko, the chief Soviet delegate, rose to give rebuttal by making an attack, some of it quite personal, against the American Senator. Wiley reacted angrily, muttering loud asides to nearby delegates and finally, in a fit of fury, seizing a copy of his earlier speech and flinging it down the table in Gromyko's direction, exclaiming, "Read that if you want to know what I said!" Onlookers for a moment feared that the press might regard the incident as the first case of overt violence in an arena where the words are frequently violent but the actions always carefully restrained. Gromyko ignored the outburst, however, and, to the relief of State Department officials, reporters failed to make anything of it.

Wiley's behavior was often intransigent during his stay at the

United Nations. At one moment he was chastising U.N. officialdom for riding in limousines instead of taxis, and the next accusing the State Department of "unbelievable naivete, laxity, and tardiness . . ." in dealing with Communist infiltration of the United Nations. Those who sought an explanation for such antics were inclined to attribute them to the fact that Wiley, unlike his junior colleague from Wisconsin, had not been asked to play any important role in the 1952 Republican campaign.

Handshakes and Hotfoots

Alexander Wiley was born sixty-nine years ago in Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin. By taking various rugged jobs, including one as a lumberjack, he made his way through the University of Michigan and later through the University of Wisconsin Law School. Early in his practice, he served three terms as District Attorney of Chippewa County, but after that the future Senator avoided politics until he was past fifty, had accumulated a comfortable financial reserve, and had reared his four children. He gave himself, however, without reserve to various community and civic-club activities, serving during the depression years as governor of the Wisconsin-Upper Michigan District of Kiwanis International and devoting fully one-fourth of his time, according to an official biography, to "touring his District so as to bolster the lagging spirits of his fellow Kiwanians and other Americans." It was this experience which thrust him into politics and which as much as anything else, some observers believe, formed many of the behavior patterns of Alexander Wiley, particularly the split-second transitions from a hand-over-heart sanctimoniousness to a prankish hotfoot humor.

In 1936, Wiley opposed and was defeated by Philip F. LaFollette in the gubernatorial race. Two years later, he ran for U.S. Senator and won out against divided Democratic and Progressive Party forces. He arrived in Washington in 1939, the same year as Robert A. Taft and Charles W. Tobey, and two years after the present ranking Republican Senator, Styles Bridges.

During his early period in the Senate, Wiley became known for two things, his unwearying publicity efforts for Wisconsin and Wisconsin cheese and his fertile imagination for projects to help meet America's vast problems. On foreign policy he, like Vandenberg, was what he prefers to term a "neutralist" during the period before America's involvement in the Second World War.

As the Senators turned their thoughts to postwar matters, Wiley moved pretty closely with Vandenberg. He voted for every one of the Democratic Administration's major postwar foreign-policy measures and against nearly every attempt to cripple them by amendment. Like Vandenberg, he argues that bipartisanship has not extended to the Far East. In 1951, he joined seven other Republicans in signing the bitterly denunciatory report on the MacArthur firing.

Odd Man Out?

Despite his willingness to stand up and be counted, there are numerous indications that the Foreign Relations Committee Chairman has not been drawn effectively into any sort of working alliance with the Administration. At the beginning of this Congress, Taft dropped his ranking position on the Finance Committee to become a junior member of Foreign Relations, thus serving notice that Wiley's authority was in dispute. During the fracas over the "Secret Agreements" resolution, it was Taft more than Wiley who called the signals and sounded re-

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treat for the Administration. Again, in the fight over the Bohlen nomination, it was Taft who pushed through the confirmation of Bohlen as U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. On June 2, when the President called Senate leaders to the White House for a showdown on the Appropriations rider cutting off funds for the U.N. if Red China should be admitted, Wiley was not invited.

The practical problem confronting Eisenhower and Dulles is that they have no troops to waste. A glance at the other Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee—H. Alexander Smith, Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Charles W. Tobey, Robert A. Taft, William Langer, Homer Ferguson, and William F. Knowland—reveals not one ideally qualified to become an Administration lieutenant on foreign policy. At the same time, from other sectors of the battlefront—the Finance Committee of the Senate, the Ways and Means Committee of the House, and the Judiciary and Appropriations Committees—there arise various other stalwarts with their own bizarre notions about foreign policy. They constitute a genuine challenge, not only to the President but to the traditional and valuable primacy of the Foreign Relations Committee Chairman.

Religion, Politics, And the 'Great Crusade'

WILLIAM LEE MILLER

STANLEY HIGH, a speech writer for Mr. Eisenhower during the campaign, claimed in the April *Reader's Digest* that a revival of moral and spiritual faith in America is "what Eisenhower really wants." Mr. Eisenhower's speeches as candidate and President would seem to support the claim. As a candidate he went well beyond the moral attack on the "corruption" of the Truman régime that might have been expected of any Republican candidate, and as a President he has gone well beyond the standard obeisances to God of a public figure as he approaches the end of his speech.

ALTHOUGH he won votes with it, Mr. Eisenhower plainly did not employ the "God stuff," as Franklin Roosevelt is reported to have called it, simply as a political device. His sincerity was the main part of his appeal.

The President's constant reference to the moral may be partly a substitute for a developed social philosophy. It is at any rate a bit sudden. Mr. Eisenhower did not seem to be especially concerned with "moral and spiritual" matters during his Army career, which in this regard was about like that of most other Army officers.

But when he first spoke as a politician in Abilene in June, 1952, he insisted that our most important strength is "spiritual values," and he kept it up all through his campaign. It was an approach to politics that the audience understood and liked, religious without being devisive, moral without being unpleasant. Like Ike, Americans remember with reverence a pious heritage, the form and spirit but not the content of which they want to preserve.

MR. EISENHOWER'S special emphasis on the moral and spiritual coincides with his participation in politics, perhaps because this new role demands something new of him. He is an expert at choosing and effecting practical means to a determined objective. But in politics the choice is not only among means but among objectives.

Like the big industrialists he admires, he prefers concrete problems: His emphasis is on getting things done. He has the gift of bringing men to work together by touching the sources of friendliness and common purpose within them. He is able to do this because the big, clear differences, as between free men and totalitarians, are of primary importance to him, and he tends to relegate to a secondary place the more subtle differences that are the stuff of politics.

These characteristic abilities of Mr. Eisenhower may be nonpolitical, but they are very American. Therefore they are successful in American politics. Above all, Mr. Eisenhower has a mind which detests ambiguity and insists on clarity. In politics, clarity is not so easy to find as it is in strategy.

But Mr. Eisenhower may have found clear lines of operation for politics by taking the American Constitution pretty much as it would be taught in a high-school civics course, ignoring much of the change and growth that make it live. The branches of the government are three, and these are separate, and these "co-ordinate branches" each have proper spheres, not to be invaded by the others. It is even helpful to explain to God, in the inaugural prayer, that one is praying only for the Executive Branch.

Finding the L.C.D.

Kenneth S. Davis, in the sympathetic biography of Eisenhower that he wrote in 1945, before Eisenhower became a political figure, makes this revealing analysis of the man's mind:

"As always when his mind was con-

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fronted with a confusion of variable factors, he was moved (1) to analyze the confusion into its 'components' so that the factors themselves could be clearly realized; (2) to assign to some one factor the status of a constant or common denominator by which the variability of all other factors could be measured; and (3) to recombine the factors in a whole which had a clear outline and a central or dominant principle. It was a technique which denied validity to whatever fluid elements might be present in a problem; whatever could not be given a rigid definition was simply excluded from consideration. It therefore might not be successful if applied without qualification in situations where the prime factors, being connotative (as is so often the case in politics), are not fit subjects for a purely logical analysis. But it was a technique that led to a great success in Dwight's chosen field."

WHEN such a mind must deal with the uncongenial field of politics, it seeks a constant factor outside the field itself. Ike's moral and spiritual values may be such a point of departure for him in politics.

In a way, what President Eisenhower appears to have done is to leap at once from the certainties of the practical world clear over the ambiguities of social philosophy into the certainties of absolute morality and religion. His campaign was explicity shaped to convince the voters of his sincere morality rather than to explain to them a program that might be followed.

The certainty with which the "moral and spiritual values" are held is for Mr. Eisenhower an emotional rather than an intellectual certainty. The phrase which he constantly used is revealing: "a *deeply felt* religious faith." Depth of feeling is the important thing, rather than any objective intellectual meaning. One might say that President Eisenhower, like many Americans, is a very fervent believer in a very vague religion.

Mr. Eisenhower summed up the content of his religion in a speech delivered in Harlem: "I do not care whether you be Baptists, whether you be Jews, whether you be Catholics or Protestants or whatever. There must be that feeling that man is made in the image of his Maker." The result of this "feeling" is a boundless confidence in man's power. Man has a "God-given ability to be master of his own destiny." "Remember your own power," he said to an audience in Montana, "and be not dismayed, because you can do

anything." These statements seem to be directly contradictory to central tenets of most religions: that man is *not* the master of his destiny, that there *are* limits on his power, that the cure for man's "dismay" is the knowledge of a power *not* his own.

THE GENERAL said over and over during the campaign that when the Founding Fathers said that men were endowed by their Creator with rights, they showed that the basis or foundation of this nation and form of government lay in a "deeply felt religious faith." Our government is the attempt to "translate" that religion into the political world. He said that no other nation has America's "spiritual and moral strength." He said that "the Almighty takes a definite and direct interest day by day in the progress of this nation." Religion appears as a wholesale endorsement of the aims and purposes of America, "the mightiest power which God has yet seen fit to put upon his footstool."

The values that spring from this commitment to religion-in-general are values-in-general. Once he named some of them this way, "Honesty, decency, fairness, service—all that sort of thing." For the most part they were unspecified.

The most definite thing President Eisenhower said about values was that they are not material. He said, "What we are really trying to defend is a way of life, a scale of moral and spiritual values. You are not just trying to save your own pocketbook." He often implied that moral value and a spiritual (i.e., nonpocketbook) outlook were identical, and that his opponents were presenting a materialistic, and therefore immoral, program as against his spiritual, and therefore moral, one.

The contrast between mere politics and Eisenhower's moral crusade appeared throughout his speeches. What he was engaged in was not a mere political campaign of just another political candidate, but something else—a moral crusade.

The crusade was successful in part because it struck the deep public desire for a way around all those political decisions which the voters found complex and tiresome. Candidate Eisenhower—or Ike—was working at a different level, a higher level. His was not a campaign to get something for his followers, but a crusade, a noble effort to do what is good. It was moral, not political. It is hard to decide about political campaigns, but to a moral crusade the answer can be clear and pure.

Hound's Teeth and Mink Coats

From this center have come several corollary doctrines.

First, there is the doctrine of the hound's tooth. Since this is a moral crusade, the crusaders must be moral. But since morality is something different from politics, the "moral" cleanliness we ask about is simply personal, and has nothing to do with policy.

When Mr. Nixon was challenged about his fund, Mr. Eisenhower quite morally insisted he must be "clean." He convinced himself, perhaps with some help from audience reaction, that Nixon was personally "honest" and joined Mr. Nixon in calling the whole challenge a smear.

The challenge had not been

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against Mr. Nixon's honesty in dealing with public or private monies at all, but the crusaders answered in these terms alone. Thus the result of the moral crusade may be to dull rather than to awaken moral concern. The more subtle and probably more important moral questions like those involved in the Nixon Fund are excluded from consideration.

SECOND, there is the doctrine of the incorruptible man. Morality, which is personal hound's-tooth cleanliness, is absolutely distinguishable from immorality. There are the corrupt, who will be replaced "from top to bottom," and the "incorruptible men," who will replace them. These seem to be permanent and exclusive categories.

The moral crusade thus tends to regard the separation of moral from immoral as an absolute division between men, rather than a relative and shifting division between values and patterns which come mixed in varying proportions in particular men. This gives the moral crusade clarity, but it also gives it rigidity in dealing with the real world. It may also cause the crusaders to ignore the structural causes of persistent immoral situations.

Charles E. Wilson's remarkable attitude at the Senate hearings on his confirmation had the flavor of this doctrine. He seemed to be saying to the Senators who had the effrontery to ask him questions about his holdings that, after all, corruption had been thrown out by definition when the Democrats were defeated and that he could not be considered susceptible to temptation. He was a member of the moral crusade.



THIRD, there is the doctrine of the blameless public.

One of the most interesting exchanges of the campaign was that between Mr. Stevenson's Los Angeles speech on corruption and Mr. Eisenhower's reply in Columbia, South Carolina. Governor Stevenson said that the morality of the public official could rise no higher than the morality of the public. He maintained that the final responsibility for corruption rested upon the public in general. General Eisenhower and his speech writers seized upon this with some glee, and worked it into the Columbia, South Carolina, speech. "Are you to blame for the loss of China?" he asked; "Are you to blame for this treadmill prosperity?" Or for the "scandal-a-day administration"? The answer in each case was no.

Mr. Eisenhower was encouraging the American public's belief that an individual must bear the whole guilt for social evil, with the public bearing no share of responsibility.

The large part of truth undeniably present in these doctrines of the moral crusade may be endangered by a certain tendency to claim the whole truth.

IN THE FIGHT over Southern delegates at the Convention, the Eisenhower delegates had a somewhat better case than the Taft delegates, but Mr. Taft was surely right when he said that it was a political question.

The moral crusaders put the whole dispute in the framework of absolute moral distinctions. Delegates had been "stolen" and there was a "moral issue" on which there could be "no compromise." They rode to victory with the flags of moral indignation flying high, and have tended to continue to ride under these same banners of absolute moral superiority.

Mr. Eisenhower's moral crusade epitomized the strong points of America: our practical idealism, our moral earnestness, our good intentions, our human friendliness, our sincerity. But it may also epitomize our chief weakness: self-righteousness. This morality, like the "religion" on which it is based, tends to be for people on the other side only. It tends to leave out self-criticism and assessment of our own responsibilities.



Another Republican

The current renewal of interest in Lincoln's political morality prompts a comparison between the moral claims of the first and the current Republican Presidents. Lincoln, too, was preoccupied with the moral implications of his acts. He saw the questions of slavery and union as moral questions. But he did not regard morality as an airtight category above and apart from the operation of politics. He, who had the clearest provocation to invoke the symbols of a righteous moral crusade, did not.

Lincoln did not imply that those who differed from him were not "moral." He explicitly stated at Cooper Union that the difference was one of sincere moral convictions on *both* sides. The absolutes of religion and morality were not identical with his side but above both sides, judging both. He prayed not that God be on his side but that he be on God's, and he left it to history to decide what was the moral crusade.

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Tunisia: The Bumpy Road To Self-Government

GEORGE H. GERARD

ON DECEMBER 5, 1952, the Tunisian nationalist leader Ferhat Hached was found on a lonely road a few miles outside of Tunis, his body riddled with machine-gun bullets, his head crushed. Hached had been the most active leader of Tunisia's independence drive against France and secretary-general of the powerful General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT). The crime was followed by a new outburst of violence against the French, whom Hached's supporters blamed for his death. The French, in turn, dismissed the assassination as the result of a nationalist intraparty feud.

TWO MONTHS before his death I had gone to see Ferhat Hached at his headquarters in the heart of the ancient, sprawling Arab quarter of Tunis. The entrance to the two-story house occupied by the labor union was in a dark, squalid alley marked by a large star and crescent, the national emblem of Tunisia. A UGTT official took me up a flight of rickety stairs to a sparsely furnished little office, where Ferhat Hached extended his hand across an ink-stained table. With his reddish-blond hair, blue eyes, and fair complexion, Hached looked anything but an Arab. Neither his costume—slacks and an open-collared brown shirt with sleeves rolled above the elbows—nor his manner, which was forceful and straightforward, reflected traditional Islamic ceremoniousness. Nearly all the other nationalist leaders I had previously met in Tunisia, as well as in Algeria and Morocco, belonged to North Africa's predominantly French-educated urban middle class. Hached, by contrast, had begun his working life at fourteen as a stevedore. He had organized the stevedores and then other Tunisian workers into the UGTT and made it a remarkably effective instrument for the propagation of nationalist ideas. It was the UGTT, with its sixty thousand working members and its numerous sympathizers throughout the country, that provided the militant liaison between the intellectual nationalists of the Neo-Destour (New Constitution) Party and the largely illiterate Tunisian masses. The house arrest of the Neo-Destour leader, Habib Bourguiba, in January, 1952, had left Hached the *de facto* chief of the nationalist movement.

After shaking hands with Hached, I remarked that I had been trying to reach him by telephone for four days, but the line had always been reported "out of order."

"Four days!" he cried. "That telephone stays 'out of order' for weeks, sometimes months on end. The French see to that, just as they intercept and censor our mail and hamper us any other way they can."

Hached gave me his views on the essential conflict in Tunisia. According to international law, he said, Tunisia did not lose its sovereignty by becoming a French protectorate in 1881, but still retained its character and status as a separate nation. The protectorate treaty of 1881 had, in his view, merely constituted a delegation of power whereby Tunisia entrusted the conduct of foreign relations and national defense to France.

"But what do we find?" he went on. "We find that the French, step by step, have seized far more power than they were entitled to under the treaty. They have taken over our entire governmental administration, putting Frenchmen into all key positions and colonizing our civil service

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from top to bottom. In short, the French have set up a system of direct rule. This has transformed Tunisia from a protectorate under international law into a veritable French colony."

Hached bitterly continued his list of Tunisian grievances: "Having imposed this *fait accompli* on Tunisia, the French now have the audacity to use their own illegal deeds as an argument for perpetuating their rule. Now they demand that the French settlers be given the right to vote here, to participate in Tunisian political life."

This "invasion of Tunisia's national sovereignty," he said, was something that he and all other Tunisians would fight to the utmost.

Sounding the Brass

A few days later a mustachioed janissary wearing a red fez and baggy pantaloons showed me into the spacious office of the head of France's protectorate régime in Tunisia, Resident-General Jean de Hauteclocque.

Everything about the man and his office suggested the stereotype of a top corporation executive: the heavy horn-rimmed glasses, the double-breasted tropical business suit, the cigar, and the wide leather-covered club chairs standing opposite the big desk. De Hauteclocque was just as positive a champion for the protectorate as Hached had been for the independence movement. Like Hached, he seemed a man with a burning desire for justice—justice for France's accomplishments in Tunisia over the past seventy years. He assured me that France was preparing the Tunisians to shoulder the responsibilities of government, but that this was a long-range program requiring patience and wisdom.

"We have promised to let the Tunisians run their own domestic affairs," said the Resident-General, "and we will not go back on that promise. If we pull out too hastily and the nationalists find themselves suddenly in full control of North Africa's political and economic machinery, there can be no question as to the result: North Africa will sink into economic collapse and political chaos—quickly, too.

"No one should ever forget," he said, "that Tunisia faces a population problem of the utmost gravity. Because the French protectorate has done away with the famines, epidemics, and tribal wars that ravaged Tunisia for centuries, the country's population has doubled in the last seventy years, and it is still increasing so rapidly that in twenty years the population will be too large for the economy to support, unless production continues to increase at the same rapid rate. But that requires capital investment, trained manpower, and technical skill. And where would Tunisia find all that, except among its European settlers? Surely not among the nationalist intellectuals."

As he dwelt on the "nationalist intellectuals," his words took on more vehemence. "Practically none of them," he said, "ever studies to be a technical man, to develop the country's resources and production by providing leadership in agriculture, industry, engineering, sanitation, communications, and such. That would be too practical a patriotism. No, they prefer to leave all that kind of work to the European settlers. And as for themselves, they simply become skilled technicians in the business of political agitation."

De Hauteclocque added that France proposed to solve the Tunisian problem by encouraging the development of a "Franco-Tunisian community" in which all groups—Moslems, Europeans, Jews—could live and work together for the common good.

The question of voting rights for the French settlers is only the latest issue over which there have been political explosions, riots and repressions, terror and counterterror in Tunisia. The greatest source of conflict is the wealthy and powerful colony of 170,000 French settlers, plus some 130,000 other Europeans who have thrust equally deep roots in the country's economic and social life. Although they comprise only one-tenth of Tunisia's population, these people pay fifty per cent of its taxes. To them North Africa is not a foreign country, it is home. This fact throws light on the psychological background of the North African conflict, and it also explains why France feels a responsibility for protecting this large European population—a problem Britain did not have to face in India or in Burma. But regardless of how many roots they have put down, the Europeans will always be regarded as interlopers by the nationalists.

Party and Bey

The Destour (Constitution) Party was founded in 1920 by a group of Tunisians under the leadership of Sheikh Abdel Aziz Taalbi. In its early years the party wrung a series of important political concessions from the French, but in 1933 a group of young French-educated intellectuals, headed by Habib Bourguiba, bolted the party (which has since become known as the Old Destour) and founded the Neo-Destour, which emphasized modern, western-style nationalism rather than Islamic traditionalism. Although it was outlawed in 1934 by the French, the Neo-Destour under Bourguiba became the principal force in Tunisia's drive for independence. The French have found themselves in the maddening situation of having to negotiate with a party that has been outlawed for nineteen years and of being faced with fresh demands whenever they make concessions to that party.

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Tunisia's nominal ruler now is Sidi Mohammed el Amine Pasha, the seventy-one-year-old, politically astute Bey of Tunis. From his ornate palace in Carthage the Bey issues his supposedly royal decrees. Inasmuch as these must bear the signature of the Resident-General, France is in a position to veto any measure considered objectionable. But the Bey, for his part, can veto the Resident-General simply by refusing to place his seal on a decree. In fact Sidi el Amine, whose pro-nationalist feelings have been growing during the past five years, has used this power with telling effect on several occasions, bringing Tunisia's entire French-operated government machinery to a dead halt.

Today, with their leadership in jail, in exile, or assassinated, the nationalists look to the Bey as the only Tunisian still capable of dramatizing the aspirations of the independence movement. The French are grimly aware that Sidi el Amine will do his utmost to thwart their plan to transform the country into a "Franco-Tunisian community." They also know that they have only one weapon against the recalcitrant Bey —the threat of dethronement.

LAST DECEMBER the Resident-General submitted to the Bey two decrees, one calling for nation-wide elections to be held for the first time in Tunisian history, the other providing that French colonists be granted the right to elect French municipal councilors to represent their interests in the country's sixty-four local assemblies. The Bey refused his seal. On December 18, the Paris government sent the Bey an ultimatum which contained a thinly veiled threat of dethronement in the event of noncompliance. Forty-eight hours later the Bey capitulated.

This electoral measure, designed to get Tunisia started along the road to internal autonomy, was a move to retain for the colonists a share in whatever new political bodies might be created to give Tunisians a voice in the country's internal affairs (defense and foreign affairs were to remain under French control).

Under the reform plan, the proportion of council members elected by the colonists may go up to fifty per cent but never higher, even in towns where the French population is larger than the Tunisian. On the district level, where the Tunisians alone are permitted to present candidates and take part in the voting, French representation is to be achieved only indirectly through participation of the municipal councils in the work of the district assemblies. On the national level France promises a gradual change from the present half-Tunisian, half-French Cabinet to an all-Tunisian Government.

THE electoral-reform plan, as the French government sees it, is the only sensible way to prepare the Tunisians for self-government. The French are convinced that this plan could gradually weld the colonists and the Tunisian population into an autonomous Franco-Tunisian state that would be indissolubly linked to France and the West.

In Tunisia the plan has pleased neither faction. The settlers have opposed it on the ground that it would give the Tunisians "far too much power" over the European minority. The Neo-Destour, on the other hand, considers the Franco-Tunisian state concept nothing but a devious device to perpetuate France's control over Tunisia.

Twenty-four hours after the Bey bowed to the French government's ultimatum, the nationalists served notice that they regarded Sidi el Amine's signature on the municipal-reform decree as null and void because of its having been "obtained under threat."

The question of political rights for the colonists thus became the one crucial issue around which the Tunisian conflict revolved. Based on this issue, the elections to be sponsored by the French under the reform plan were also to be a test case of far-reaching importance, since France was definitely thinking of working out a similar pattern for Morocco as part of a program for integrating North Africa into the French Union.

When the caïdales, or rural elections, took place last April, with only native Tunisians eligible as voters and candidates, the nationalist boycott was only partly effective and about sixty per cent of the voters turned out. But last May's municipal elections, involving French participation in the urban centers, most of which are traditional strongholds of the Neo-Destour, turned out to be quite a different story. Tunisian voters and candidates were threatened with death if they participated. One of the country's foremost moderate leaders, seventy-one-year-old Chedly Kastalli, refused to withdraw his candidacy, and on

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May 2 was stabbed to death. Kastalli's assassination and reports that several other nonboycotters had been killed or wounded created an atmosphere of panic, particularly in Tunis, where the clandestine organization of the Neo-Destour is known to be particularly strong. Many Tunisian candidates hastily withdrew from the elections and in several towns the voting had to be canceled for lack of Tunisian candidates. In Tunis, fewer than nine per cent of the registered native voters dared to go to the polls.

As a result, the nationalists have apparently succeeded in turning the French reform plan into a dismal political fiasco. Even though a relatively creditable forty-eight per cent of the voters turned out in towns located in the interior, and only 123 out of 436 Tunisian councilors' seats were left vacant, the Neo-Destour's successful terror campaign completely intimidated most of those still willing to work toward a "reasonable" solution.

Not only have the Tunisian middle-of-the-roaders failed to gain ground and to capture the leadership of the Neo-Destour Party, but many of them who have hitherto prided themselves on their positions in the French-operated civil service now fear for their lives. Tunisian members of Premier Salah el Dine Baccouche's half-French, half-Tunisian Cabinet must be guarded day and night.

Silence in Paris

From faraway Paris, again in the throes of a deep governmental crisis, no helpful guidance has been forthcoming. As usually happens in this situation, the leadership falls back into the hands of the protectorate officials in Tunis, and the pressure of various blocs increases. Some think that the only way out is to release Bourguiba and the other Neo-Destour leaders and to negotiate with them. Others suggest bringing the Bey around to greater pliability by exiling Prince Chedly, the aged ruler's eldest and favorite son, an intimate friend of Ferhat Hached and a militant nationalist. If worst comes to worst, the French might even dethrone the Bey. This, however, would be a truly desperate

gamble, in view of the monarch's immense popularity in a country already shaken. It might easily lead to more anarchy and chaos in North Africa, and also endanger the western strategic position there.

North Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Libyan Desert constitutes a gigantic "sanctuary" about one-third the size of the United States where NATO's armed power can be concentrated across the Mediterranean from Europe. The area bristles with powerful western military bases. At its western tip are the seven mammoth airfields built and operated by the U.S. Air Force in Morocco. In the center is the great naval and submarine base of Mers-el-Kebir near Oran. In Tunisia the powerful fortress of Bizerte, overlooking the narrow Mediterranean gateway between Sicily and Africa, controls the flow of traffic to the Middle and Far East.

From an economic standpoint the interdependence of North Africa and western Europe is equally great. France is determined to hang on to North Africa's tremendous resources and potentialities as a means of preserving its place in the world, and particularly its position in Europe in the face of German resurgence. A French leader said to me: "Europe's economy has become so intermingled with that of Africa that any attempt to separate them would be mortally dangerous for both." He envisaged the emergence of "Eurafrica" as a unit strong enough to form a really effective bulwark against ideological and military conquest by the Soviets.

The work of Communist agents in North Africa these days consists mainly in fanning nationalist extremism to the point of violent explosion. In order to intensify and co-ordinate agitation in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, a Communist Action Committee for North Africa was set up on Moscow's orders in November, 1951, with instructions to oppose the creation of western military bases in the area by all and every means. Moscow has excellent reasons for plugging nationalism, neutralism, and anti-French and anti-western feelings among the North Africans, rather than Communism as such. The Moslem population is virtually immune to Communism as a result of Islam's inherent opposition to Communist doctrine. Eighty per cent of Tunisia's cultivated land is owned by small native farmers who don't want to be collectivized. The French settlers are conservative and strongly anti-Communist. As for the Red-dominated French CGT (General Confederation of Labor), its membership and influence are extremely small, because of the fact that virtually all the native workers switched over to Ferhat Hached's all-Tunisian and anti-Communist UGTT when the latter left the parent union in 1944.

Thus, so far as its popular following is concerned, Communism *as such* is not a serious menace in North Africa—at least for the time being. The question is: Would that still be true if and when the nationalists gained control of Tunisia?

For the United States, the Tunisian problem constitutes a particularly painful dilemma. The nationalists and their backers in the Arab-Asian-African bloc are already accusing us of "countenancing imperialism" by our failure to take a positive stand in favor of Tunisian and Moroccan independence. And as Secretary Dulles was given to understand during his recent trip through the Middle East and South Asia, if we give the impression of aligning ourselves with the hated "colonialists" we shall antagonize not only three million Tunisians but also the thirty million Arabs of the Middle East, where the West's position is already tenuous, and beyond that the three hundred million people of the Moslem world.

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The Forlorn Dream Of Rudolf Nadolny

THEODORE DRAPER

DR. RUDOLF NADOLNY, the German diplomat who died in May at the age of eighty, was a symbolic figure. Until the day of Nadolny's death, the mere mention of his name was enough to raise the specter of German-Soviet alliance. Since that ghost has still not been laid, Nadolny's historic role will continue to arouse interest long after many of his more powerful contemporaries have been forgotten.

Nadolny was one of the officials of the German Foreign Ministry who prepared the ground for the first German-Soviet pact, concluded at Rapallo in 1922. Later, as German Ambassador in Moscow, he anticipated Hitler by five years in attempting to negotiate a Nazi-Soviet pact in 1933 and 1934. After the Second World War he came out of retirement to play a highly provocative role in personal negotiations with the Russians in Berlin.

Nadolny was a diplomat of the old Bismarckian school. But Bismarck's principle that Germany should never have to fight Russia was only a starting point for him. Nadolny's family went back to the fourteenth century in East Prussia, where there is such a profound Slavic admixture that the East Prussians have always looked toward the East with horror or with fascination. In many cases, it seems that unless they suppress their Slavic antecedents under a fanatical hatred of the East, they feel themselves pulled back into an obscure Slavic past with mystical visions of a grandiose German-Slav reconciliation to rule the world. Nadolny was basically an East Prussian romantic of the latter type. In his book *Germanisierung oder Slavisierung?*, he put forward the idea of a new kind of German-Slav *Volk* embracing thirty million people east of the Elbe.

In 1902 Nadolny entered the German Foreign Service, and a year later he was sent off as vice-consul to his first post, which happened to be St. Petersburg. In his four years there he began acquiring the background that enabled him to become the head of the *Ostabteilung*, the Eastern Section of the Foreign Ministry, in 1917. Nadolny served as chief of the *Ostabteilung* until the beginning of 1919.

ABOUT this time an increasingly influential group began to insist that the only way to cheat the Allied powers of the fruits of their victory was for Germany to make common cause with Russia, even with Soviet Russia. The *Ostabteilung* was the diplomatic center of this strategy, but among those who accepted or flirted with it were General Hans von Seeckt, head of the Army; Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, the first postwar Foreign Minister; and the statesman-industrialist Walther Rathenau.

Wide World

Rudolf Nadolny

Nadolny's successor as head of the *Ostabteilung*, Baron Ago von Maltzan, was chiefly responsible for the Rapallo Agreement. Nadolny himself had become *chef de cabinet* to President Friedrich Ebert at the beginning of 1920. Later that year he was appointed Ambassador to Sweden. After the Rapallo Agreement was signed on April 16, 1922, Nadolny was one of three German candidates for the job of taking charge of the vast economic and military collaboration that had been envisaged at Rapallo. The Russians, however, preferred Brockdorff-Rantzau, and Nadolny returned to Stockholm for two more years. In 1924, Berlin began soft-pedaling the Rapallo policy, and Nadolny was transferred to Turkey, where he remained until 1932.

Nadolny's Big Rapallo Revival

While Nadolny had only helped to prepare the way for Rapallo, he played a leading role in similar diplomatic maneuvers a decade later. In 1932 he was appointed chief of the German delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. In January, 1933, while the talks dragged wearily on, Hitler seized power. To everyone's surprise, one of his first diplomatic acts, the following May, was to renew the German-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1926. Hitler subsequently told Nadolny, according to the latter, that this act did not have any significance because he "did not as yet understand much about foreign politics." In any case, despite the renewal of

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the pact German-Soviet relations rapidly deteriorated.

Some time ago, I wrote to Dr. Nadolny asking for information about his activities on behalf of a German-Soviet pact in 1933 and 1934. He was kind enough to send me two long letters explaining that hitherto tantalizingly obscure episode in detail.

In one of his letters to me Nadolny revealed how he happened to be sent to Moscow as Hitler's Ambassador in November, 1933: "Litvinov had already been negotiating with the French in Geneva. He had explicitly asked me, however, to come to Moscow as Ambassador, and I had put it through in Berlin." Nadolny became available after Hitler withdrew from the Disarmament Conference in October, 1933, but it is noteworthy that the Soviet Foreign Minister had taken the initiative.

NADOLNY was told by Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath that his mission in Moscow was "to normalize the relations between Russia and Germany." Nadolny reported this to Litvinov and asked him to make some proposals. After a while, Litvinov suggested that Germany and Russia should sign an agreement "not to seize and annex the Baltic States." Nadolny turned this down on the ground that Germany had no such intentions. In return, however, Nadolny told Litvinov that what was needed was a general agreement in which the Baltic question could be included. Litvinov replied that Russia was prepared to consider any proposals Germany might wish to present.

Here is Nadolny's account of the subsequent events:

"With this accomplished, I went to Berlin in June, 1934. There I first took the matter up with the Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath. He told me that he agreed but that I would have difficulties with Chancellor Hitler. Thereupon I went to Hitler and I also put the matter up to him. He listened to the proposal quietly and said that he was in agreement with me in regard to the facts involved. But he did not wish to have anything to do with those people. At this I gave him a memorandum to read over the Whitsuntide holiday.

"After Whitsuntide, he sent for the Foreign Minister and myself. He again turned down negotiations with the Russians and said that he would much rather come to an understanding with the English. The Foreign Minister then supported him. But when I remained firm, he finally said that I should put my proposals in writing and send them to him through the Foreign Minister within three days. I drew up a suitable memorandum and gave it to State Secretary von Bülow. He asked the opinion of officials in the Foreign Ministry and they went even farther than my proposals. But Neurath only took my memorandum and at the same time drew up an answer rejecting it.

"Neurath then went to the Chancellor and, after receiving approval of his position, told me about it with the proviso that I should go back to Moscow. I refused to do so and demanded that the decision should be changed or else I would resign. He then informed the Chancellor, who, as Neurath told me, refused to make any change. Simultaneously both of them went to President Hindenburg and put through my recall with him.

"The agreement which I had envisaged was almost identical with the Friendship Agreement that Ribbentrop concluded in 1939."

Thus the German-Soviet pact was delayed for five years because Hitler was not ready for it. One of Nadolny's former colleagues told me that Nadolny had dared to shout back at Hitler, something no one ever tried again without losing more than his job. In any case, Nadolny merely sulked for the next ten years.

Out of Mothballs

When the war ended in 1945, Nadolny was living quietly in the little village of Gransee in Mecklenburg, which was overrun by the Soviet Army. He was then seventy-two years old, but still capable of one more outburst of excitement and ambition.

Nadolny hurried to Berlin, conceiving of himself as a man of destiny to lead the German nation out of its terrible ordeal. His entire past, he felt, had prepared him for this moment. Had he not sacrificed his career attempting to obtain an understanding with the Russians? Was not an old dream of his the creation of a new German-Slav *Volk*? And was he not, nevertheless, a Westerner in his social and political inclinations? Would not his former diplomatic colleagues in the West trust him?

And so Rudolf Nadolny convinced himself that he had been chosen for a great mission: to reconcile East and West and, in so doing, save Germany, whose fate depended on such a reconciliation.

At first the Russians in Berlin played Nadolny's game. The door of Arkady Sobolev, Marshal Zhukov's political adviser, was open to him. The Americans also talked to him. Both sides were still groping and he benefited from the early postwar optimism. Dr. Rudolf Nadolny was again an important diplomat, though a self-appointed one.

But the honeymoon period was running out fast, and Nadolny was one of the first victims of the growing disillusionment. He found himself in increasing difficulties with the Russians. The one thing that they absolutely demanded of any German who enjoyed their favor was endorsement of the Oder-Neisse frontier. But Nadolny was too much a good German nationalist to acquiesce in the removal of fifteen million Germans by Soviet Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In 1947, the Russians suddenly closed their doors to

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him. The Americans tired of his double game. The German Communists began to attack him because he would not lend his name to one of their fronts, the People's Congress.

Nadolny was finished in Berlin. He realized that both sides had only wished to use him for their own ends. At the end of 1948 he packed up and removed to Rheinsberg in the British Zone. But in 1949 the German press began to take an intense interest in his every move.

The tireless Nadolny had sent out invitations to a highly suspect group of German officials, financiers, and ex-diplomats for a "private tea party" in Bad Godesberg, at the home of Dr. Andreas Hermes. Since Dr. Hermes had been a leading member of the German Government twenty-eight years earlier, in the days of Rapallo, the more sensational papers claimed to recognize the long hand of Moscow. One of the participants later told me that it was a gathering of disillusioned old men who spent most of their time bewailing the state of the world in general and that of Germany in

particular. The only thing that all of them could agree on was that Germany should be reunited.

In any case, the publicity given his tea party again forced Nadolny to bide his time. He tried to call another meeting a few months later, but most of the original guests found it safer to stay away. Yet he refused to be completely discouraged. Early in 1950, with Dr. Hermes, he founded the Society for the Reunification of Germany. About sixty people, mostly second-rate politicians, industrialists, journalists, and intellectuals, attended the first meeting in Bad Homburg. From then until his death three years later, little was heard of Nadolny.

WHEN NADOLNY was a young man and even well along in middle age, it was possible for an East Prussian to look at Russia as if it were Germany's frontier, a vast open space for expansion and creativity. As late as 1922 the Rapallo Treaty still reflected such an attitude. By the time Nadolny died, Germany's very existence seemed to depend on the indulgence of an inconceivable, colossal Russian whim. A weak Germany as well as a strong one had to look eastward. Nadolny represented both phases, a stupendous transformation in one lifetime. To understand the Nadolnys is to understand how Germany's destiny and Russia's have been inextricably linked.

The Watchful Congressmen And the Wasteful Army

MILTON LEHMAN

THE CONGRESSMAN'S role as cost accountant for the nation is an honorable one. And the military establishment, which spends a major share of the Federal budget, certainly merits the Congressman's closest attention. Such study, however, takes time and requires the patient evaluation of complex facts. Some Congressmen insist on quicker results.

The Army is surely one of the most griped-at institutions in the Republic, and has been since the days of George Washington. A historian of that period noted that Congress "pecked at Washington, rebuked Stark, displaced Schuyler, ignored Arnold, cast aspersions on Greene and Knox, court-martialled Sullivan, Saint Clair, Wayne and Matthews because they lost engagements, and ousted Trumbull, the commissary general, so that shoes and clothes lay rotting in hogsheads by the roadside undelivered to the needy troops." And then, the historian went on to record, the Congressmen jumped on the Army because supplies weren't being delivered on time.

NOW as then, it's open season on the Army. In the last months of his Administration, President Truman asked all Cabinet officers to make a confidential survey of Congressional charges against Executive Departments in order to determine which complaints were justified and which were not. The results of the survey were never announced, but of all the Executive Departments, the Army, as usual, had the gloomiest tale to tell.

One member of the Army secretariat, now retired, summed it up for me this way: "Here at the Army level, we were all eager. We thought maybe some good would come of this survey. When we got finished, we found that about seventy-five per cent of the Congressmen's charges

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were untrue, fifteen per cent were based on half-truths and could be argued either way, and less than ten per cent made sense and put Congress, the public, and the Army on the same team."

I DECIDED to make a brief survey of my own into Congressional charges against the Army. I found that the vast majority of them ranged from the trifling to the absurd, and it was this majority that invariably made the headlines. I also found, it must be said, a few Congressmen exploring, without benefit of headlines, such complex problems as the Army's manpower policy, which rejects hundreds of thousands of usable men as 4-Fs; its transport policy, which provides all-purpose jeeps and trucks for many stateside units that perhaps could get along just as well with cheaper commercial vehicles; and its purchasing policy, which has not yet achieved top economy by unification with the purchasing of other services. But there were arguments to consider on all sides of these difficult questions, and most of the Congressional investigators prefer less arduous assignments. Here are some of the ways in which Congressmen have managed to make headlines recently:

(1) Accusing a general of building a "luxury lodge" with government funds to entertain himself and "lady friends"; (2) implying that the Quartermaster Corps had put costly suspender buttons on trousers while at the same time forbidding soldiers to wear suspenders; (3) announcing that the Army had bought sixty-eight million can openers for an Army of some two million men at "fantastic" cost; and (4) asserting that the Army had bought $45 million worth of overcoats that turned out to be too heavy and too loaded with gadgets to be usable.

The last of these charges came from Representative R. Walter Riehlman, a Republican of upstate New York, and produced some bold black headlines this April. Congressman Riehlman, chairman of a House Government Operations subcommittee, announced that the Army had received 1,262,000 of these overcoats and that "nobody knows now where most of them are" except for a few that got to Korea but were "too heavy to walk in." When the Army found that these overcoats were "useless," the Congressman went on, it spent an additional five million dollars to remodel them, but most of the remodeled coats also turned out to be unusable.

The Army lost its battle with Congressman Riehlman, although it turned out hundreds of multigraphed "Fact Sheets" in an attempt to set the facts in order for the press and Congress. (The Fact Sheet was originally called "Statement of Army Position" until a perceptive captain in Public Information noted that the initials spelled SOAP. "We can't give them an opening like that," the captain insisted.)

The Army declared that the unfortunate overcoat as first ordered in 1946 was designed to have a removable lining and attached leg protectors—the "gadgets" referred to by Congressman Riehlman. Later developments ruled the coats out for combat wear, but, minus leggings, they were issued to troops in the United States, Alaska, and the Far East. The material in the leggings was used in the manufacture of



parka hoods—not much of a saving to the taxpayer, but a saving nonetheless—and some 751,527 of the overcoats, modified for better fit and appearance at a cost of $1.30 each, have since been issued to the troops. But the Army had run up an expensive alteration bill and deserved censure on that score, unless one was willing to concede that the Army had a right to change its style in overcoats between 1946 and 1953. In any event, Congressman Riehlman had exaggerated the taxpayers' loss by some $44 million. But the Army's facts were not nearly so newsy as the Congressman's original charge.

Suspenders and Can Openers

Representative Walter Norblad (R., Oregon) needed only a letter from a constituent to start the suspender-button controversy. "My son has just returned on furlough from his Army camp," the constituent wrote. "He told me of a situation wherein buttons for suspenders are placed on uniforms, but the soldiers themselves are told that they are not allowed to wear suspenders. This appears to me to be a great waste of money and I would like to know why this situation exists."

While the nation chuckled over one more instance of Army stupidity, the Army ground out the dull, drab facts. First, said the Army Quartermaster, suspenders are a standard item for winter combat uniforms because that uniform, based on the layer principle, calls for at least two pairs of trousers, and it would obviously be too cumbersome to support each pair with a separate belt. Second, the Quartermaster went on, commercial-type suspenders could be worn by soldiers in semi-dress uniform as provided in Paragraph 23, SR 600-32-1, entitled "Articles and Types of Uniform for Male Personnel," which states: "Suspenders of commercial pattern may be worn but must not be visible."

Nobody paid much attention to Army's long-winded explanation about suspender buttons or, a while later, about can openers. The can-opener crisis was launched by Congressman Thor Tollefson (R., Washington), who discovered that the Army had purchased sixty-eight million can openers since the Korean campaign began—enough can openers, he asserted, to supply an Army of two million with more than thirty can openers apiece.

While the press and radio echoed Tollefson's cry of "incredible waste," the Army Quartermaster again offered the boring facts. The can openers, said the Quartermaster, were simply small bits of hinged metal, costing less than two cents apiece

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and weighing less than two-tenths of an ounce, designed specifically for the C-ration cans soldiers carry into battle. Each opener was intended to serve a soldier for a day, and after that he could throw it, or what was left of it, away. The openers were meant to be expendable, like the little devices on sardine cans, the Quartermaster droned on, not knowing that his audience had walked out.

No Formica, No Ladies

Of all Congressional targets, none is quite so attractive as the Army's top brass, and, in some ways, none is so defenseless. Representative Pat Sutton of Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, faced last year with a tough primary race, eagerly tackled the public's favorite straw man to demonstrate his determination to root out "graft and corruption" in the Army.

Before the House of Representatives and a gallery of fascinated reporters, Sutton charged that Lieutenant General Edward H. Brooks, commander of the Second Army, had built himself a $27,000 lodge at the A. P. Hill Military Reservation near Fredericksburg, Virginia. The lodge, Sutton went on, had been erected at the taxpayers' expense for the private amusement of the General, who held riotous parties there for top Pentagon brass and "lady friends."

Sutton painted a grim picture of the General's callousness toward the public coffers. "I went through that lodge, Mr. Speaker, from top to bottom," he said. "It has nine bathrooms in it . . . In the kitchen are two brand-new electric stoves . . . two brand-new refrigerators . . . new formica all over the tops of the kitchen cabinets . . . new inlaid linoleum on the barroom floor . . . the heating system has been recently installed. . . .

"Then there was a sign up a tree," the Congressman went on. "I would say it was 16 or 18 inches square: 'Off limits to all Military Personnel.' I asked the sergeant, 'Why is that sign there?' He said, 'When the General is here, he does not want the troops on maneuvers coming up and asking for a drink of water. He does not want to be bothered with them.'"

The Sutton charges were totally groundless. The Army pointed out that the lodge was not built at taxpayers' expense. It was constructed in 1938, several years before the Army purchased A. P. Hill as a maneuver area. The lodge was included in the package price of $72,500 which the Army paid for a half-dozen buildings, a mill, a lake, and 621 acres. The building is used as bachelor officers' quarters for troops on maneuvers, and, what's more, the bachelors must pay for their lodging.

Furthermore, the Army spokesman reported, Congressman Sutton must have been mistaken about the lodge's "luxury." The bedrooms were furnished with G.I. cots and olive-drab blankets. There were four bathrooms, not nine. The kitchen ranges were at least one year old when the Congressman saw them, and one of the two refrigerators was ten years old. The other was purchased out of bachelor-officer funds. There was no formica in the kitchen,

only linoleum; there was no barroom at all; and the heating system had been installed several years before the Army bought A. P. Hill.

The General's alleged callousness toward thirsty G.I.s was also without basis in fact. The off-limits sign wasn't posted at the lodge but at the cottage of a sergeant who served as caretaker and was put there to give the sergeant's family a degree of privacy. The sergeant told the Army investigators that he had never suggested that General Brooks refused water to parched soldiers; in fact, he couldn't recall that General Brooks had ever spent a night at the lodge, let alone entertaining Pentagon brass and "lady friends" there. "I don't even know what the General looks like," said the sergeant.

Congressman Sutton met the Army's counterattack by plunging recklessly ahead. Gathering six reporters, he charged on A. P. Hill. Military Police stopped the Sutton party near the "luxury lodge" and promptly summoned the post commandant, Colonel Julian Raymond. Colonel Raymond wanted to know whether the visitors had a permit to visit A. P. Hill. Sutton brought out his Congressional credentials. "It is only common courtesy to stop by the post headquarters," replied Colonel Raymond.

The Congressman and the Colonel had a brief talk. Sutton admitted that conceivably the lodge was built twenty years ago, but a bathhouse nearby, he declared, was probably erected after the Second World War. Colonel Raymond was in no mood for apple polishing. "I don't give a damn what you think," he snapped. "The bathhouse was built in 1929."

At this point, the Army considered its rebuttal of Mr. Sutton complete. But the Congressman won his election.

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Europe's Most Vital Unfinished Business

GUY MOLLET

The treaty to establish a European Defense Community, the central objective of all American diplomacy in western Europe, was signed in May, 1952, by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. But before the treaty goes into effect, it must be ratified by the various west European parliaments. Its fate depends largely on one country—France. And in France, the parliamentary votes are so divided that ratification of the treaty depends on one bloc—the hundred French Socialist Deputies in the National Assembly. These Deputies are influenced by their party's secretary-general, Guy Mollet, more than by any other personality in their ranks. In this article, Guy Mollet has written for THE REPORTER *an authoritative explanation of the reservations and conditions French Socialists place upon their support of the* EDC.

THE PROBLEM of European unification is of course linked to that of Europe's military defense; but while no one denies that the Russian threat is a major factor in the European drive toward unity, it would be a mistake to think that the obvious need for defense is the most important consideration involved. Even if there were no military threat, the nations of Europe would still have to break down the obsolete barriers between the peoples of Europe which restrict markets and make economic co-ordination impossible.

Socialists, and particularly French Socialists, were among the first to attack the problem of unification after the war, because they believe that no nation by its own resources can assure its economic balance and social progress, or guarantee its independence. A renowned Socialist, Ernest Bevin, once said that the nations of Europe must live united or perish one after the other. The danger they face is not only invasion but also economic stagnation and social chaos.

I SHALL not labor the obvious reasons why we Socialists were forced to abandon the project of unifying all the peoples of continental Europe. The adamant opposition of the Soviet Union and its satellites to all effective co-operation compelled us to give up theoretical plans for a Europe federated from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains and to substitute the concept of a free Europe open to any nation willing to accept democracy for itself and as the law of nations.

Differences of opinion appeared at the outset among the fifteen countries which established the Council of Europe in Strasbourg last March. It was soon evident that the British, followed by the Scandinavians, were hostile to even the partial loss of sovereignty implicit in the creation of a supranational authority. Complete federation was therefore impossible unless we were willing to build a Europe without Great Britain's participation.

We Socialists were and are strongly opposed to any such plan. Were we reduced, then, to nothing

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more than the traditional formula of simple co-operation among governments? Obviously such a plan could not solve Europe's difficulties. It could not integrate Germany into a European whole and thus assure German participation in the defense of Europe. For even if we French Socialists have always advocated giving our former enemy equal rights in the European Community, we cannot tolerate the granting of total autonomy to a German state with a German national army at its disposal. This, we feel, would endanger European security and world peace, and would be eminently dangerous to German democracy itself.

OUR PROBLEM was further complicated by the fact that some of those who were working for a united Europe were tempted, when faced with British and Scandinavian abstention, to create a federal community of only those nations that were willing to give up a certain amount of national sovereignty. This reasoning led to the project of a six-power federation—Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—a project that French Socialists can in no way endorse.

Not only would such a shrunken Europe be economically unviable; the formula would contradict the whole concept of a unified Europe. It would create between the federated and the unfederated nations a division that would bring about the worst sort of economic and political competition. Furthermore, we Socialists insist that in the Europe we are building, Great Britain must become the indispensable counterweight to Germany—particularly in military matters.

A Third Course

The two tentative solutions to the problem—a six-power community with unlimited authority and simple co-operation between governments—must both be rejected. A majority of French Socialists have turned to a third: the "functional supranational community." Instead of a community that would be geographically limited to a particular number of nations (six are involved at present) and which would have unlimited authority, instead of a superstate

governing a fixed and exclusive number of nations, we Socialists have accepted the principle of specialized communities. Each of these communities would handle a specific problem: coal, steel, agriculture, transport, power, defense, health, and so on.

Under this formula the number of participating states would not be limited. A nation unwilling to participate in a transportation community might nevertheless find it advantageous to belong to an agriculture community. It would thus become possible to fulfill two of our major aims, that of creating flexible institutions capable of attracting the greatest possible number of adherents and that of creating as strong a bond as possible between these various specialized communities and nonparticipating nations such as Great Britain.

It was with this purpose that we voted to ratify the Coal and Steel Community, better known as the Schuman Plan. But when it came to the European Defense Community, major difficulties arose. The Socialist Party debated the subject at length, and in May, 1952, the party's national congress adopted the following resolution:

"In the matter of the draft for the European Defense Community, whose final text is not yet known, the party will decide the question of ratification in a meeting of its national council. The latter will evaluate to what degree satisfaction has been obtained on points it considers essential for the effectiveness of the treaty, notably:

"An American guarantee against possible breaking or violation of the treaty by a member nation.

"The form and the nature of the close association to be established between the European Defense Community and Great Britain.

"Reconsideration, in a special agreement that could be brought immediately into effect, of those articles in the treaty concerning the future political structure of Europe."

It is evident that we French Socialists support the principle of the European Defense Community. It is equally evident that the party will decide in due time—that is to say, at the last minute—whether or not the treaty furnishes the assurances and guarantees upon which the party insists.

IN THE FIRST PLACE we think it is necessary that the United States guarantee in some form or other what I call the *indissolubility* of the future Defense Community. Some of the EDC's sincerest supporters fear that in spite of all pledges, a member nation might find it opportune to leave the Community and reclaim its national autonomy. Although the United States government has not been very specific on this point, it would seem, according to certain official declarations, that the Eisenhower Administration shares our point of view. If the State Department would clarify its position, the risk of possible secession would be greatly diminished.

The third point of the Socialist resolution concerns the future political structure of Europe, and it comes next in the order of our present anxieties. Naturally we pay particular attention to the question of democratic control of the EDC and to the nature of its political authority. The expression "political authority" has caused regrettable confusion. For the supporters of a six-power federation have interpreted Socialist agreement on the principle of political authority as constituting agreement with their own concept of a federated superstate.

But these partisans of the "Little Europe" idea do not follow their own theories to a logical conclusion. A true federation implies a central supranational power, an authority competent in almost all fields and

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controlled by a parliament directly elected by the peoples of the federated states. It implies, furthermore, the existence among all peoples integrated in the federation of a sort of federal consciousness which transcends national consciousness.

The fact is that no such federal consciousness exists at present among the peoples of the six-power federation. They are keenly aware of certain common interests but not of a total community of interest. The "Little Europe" federalists, obliged to take this fact into consideration, have tended to leave to member states all their basic powers and to delegate to the federal government only limited powers over which the member states still exercise control. And they have done this while continuing to advocate almost total powers for the federal authority.

The unavoidable result, so far as one can see it in the blueprint for a European political community drafted in March by the *ad hoc* assembly in Strasbourg, is that the real power and competence remain with the member states represented by a Council of Ministers, while the other branches of the projected European Community, with its Executive, Parliament, and Court, would have no more than nominal competence and power. The federal authority, condemned to wait until the governments concerned delegated their powers, would be reduced to a consultative organization.

The Art of the Possible

We Socialists propose a different formula: the creation of a central authority with truly supranational powers but powers to be exercised only within precisely defined fields. For the time being, this central authority would handle defense and coal and steel, since these two communities already exist and include the same participants.

The "Little Europe" project makes co-operation between member and nonmember states increasingly difficult. Whether its authority remained vague or whether the federation became a real superstate, its relations with nonparticipating states would be equally difficult.

This is the basis for our opposition to the present project. If truly



democratic control over EDC were assured, we Socialists would find it easier to ratify. But the present clumsy insistence on a pseudo federation of six powers will only strengthen our doubts.

OUR THIRD anxiety, the weightiest of them all, is the necessity of bringing Great Britain into EDC. A great many factors make Britain's presence imperative. It is of the utmost importance that the internal balance of the Community be assured so that no one state predominates. It must not be thought that we French suffer from an inferiority complex; it is simple common sense that leads us to acknowledge that France's presence in itself is not enough to counterbalance the influence of Germany. The balance of power would be totally changed with Great Britain in the Community.

Furthermore, it is in Great Britain's interest to avoid letting the EDC be dominated by forces which would inevitably bring about a shift in alliances. It is also in Great Britain's interest to strengthen an international third force that can play a great role in safeguarding peace.

Exactly what precise form such British participation should take is not our task to define. That is a question for specialists. What matters to us, from a broad political point of view, is that the treaty should provide for British participation in the deliberations of EDC and, still more, that British troops should remain on the Continent as long as EDC remains operative.

The British are visibly reluctant to enter into any precise engagements. Rightly or wrongly, they fear that the United States, assuming that EDC and British forces are enough to defend Europe, will withdraw American troops from the Continent. The British objection is a serious one, and it is not in our power to change the facts on which it is based. But we Socialists are inclined to suggest that a solution might be found by extending the NATO agreements so that American troops will remain in Europe during the lifetime of the EDC.

Our British friends occasionally show their irritation at our continued insistence that they commit themselves formally to defending Europe. Asking them to do that, they say, reveals a lack of confidence. That is not the case at all. We do not doubt that Great Britain is sincerely determined to take an effective part in the defense of the Continent. But we French are forced to enter into specific treaty obligations, and we feel, therefore, that our allies should do so too. Sometimes circumstances make necessary exact commitments of intentions, even when no one doubts them. The British intend to participate in Europe's defense; that intention must be spelled out in the treaty.

The Loyal Opposition

Here I should like to call the attention of American readers to the peculiar character of the problems with which the ratification of the EDC treaty confronts the French Socialist Party.

The position of our Socialist Party is known abroad only through incomplete and, only too often, slanted press accounts. And of course it is easy enough to misrepresent our position on the basis of some speech made by one or another of our party members. We Socialists are democrats; only those decisions made after free debate in the official meetings of the Socialist Party express our stand.

Everyone knows that a certain number of French Socialists are, on principle and for fairly obvious reasons, extremely hostile to any German participation in the European army. These Socialists are a minority

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within the party. Another minority would be willing to ratify the treaty even if, when the time came to vote, no satisfactory answer had been made to the reservations and demands made officially by the Socialist Party. This second minority, more afraid of Russia than of Germany, has been won over to the idea of European federation, even if it is limited to six nations. I must insist that it is not these minorities that will decide. It is the majority of the Socialists who will decide, but not until they know whether or not satisfactory answers have been given on the points outlined here.

THE FRENCH political situation is characterized by the fact that all recent Cabinets have derived their powers from the Center and the Right, and their financial, economic, and social policies, in our opinion as Socialists, have been catastrophically opposed to the interests of the working classes. We Socialists therefore remain in absolute opposition to any and all French Governments dependent on this kind of majority.

The time will come when we must vote for or against the treaty. If we decide to vote for ratification, that will quite probably mean supporting a Government we oppose. Since the Government will surely lose some of its usual support, it may mean, also, that our votes will be responsible for keeping that Government in power. We want so strongly to organize a peaceful Europe that, if need be, we shall subordinate legitimate internal politics to that end.

I am proud to say this. But I would like to make clear the dilemma in which we are placed. In voting to ratify the EDC treaty, we would save a Government we would like to see fall. It is easy to predict what our adversaries, particularly the Communists, would say in that event. With their usual bad faith they would accuse us of being the accomplices of reaction.

That is why the French Socialist Party, no matter how anxious it is to help organize collective security and Europe's defense, cannot vote for ratification unless its demands for the treaty's revision are taken into consideration. These demands we consider legitimate.

VIEWS & REVIEWS

A Woman Looks At Men's Magazines

NAOMI BARKO

FOR those uneasy critics of popular publishing who, as the comic books flourished like weeds and the near-pornography overwhelmed the newsstands, flung their hands to the midtown skyscrapers and moaned "What next?," there is now an answer—the men's magazines.

When the latest census of newsstands was taken, there were twenty-two men's magazines. Circulation managers, who speak of them with something akin to awe, hesitate to go on record with an over-all sales figure, but when one is mentioned it is well over ten million. Ten million copies is almost the combined weekly circulation of *Life, Newsweek,* and the *Saturday Evening Post.* While most other magazines since the war have had a slow, respectable sales increase of less than fifteen per cent, the men's field has gained sixty-two per cent.

The material of this publishing bonanza is not easy to define. Coming under the heading of men's magazines are both the blueblooded



Gentry and the unsubtle *Sir!* The editors of the sophisticated *Esquire* and the prosperous *Argosy* do not even recognize their poor relations who have never made their way out of pulp paper. But if a curve of sales averages were drawn, the typical men's magazine could be described as the slick grandchild of the pulps, the tabloid newspapers, and the less bitchy women's magazines. From one it has taken the characteristic of escape reading, from another the technique of sensational journalism, and from the third the spurious authenticity of the "true fact."

War, Women, and Wrongdoing

The best seller of all the men's magazines is a slick, competently written Fawcett publication called *True.* It is significant that only eight years ago *True* was a detective pulp. Its circulation began to climb to its present 1,750,000 only when its publishers discovered the paradoxical base formula for men's magazines: Fact can be better escape than fiction.

True to its name, *True* publishes only articles. The blight of plain fact is removed from them by a style bordering on that of the short story. There is usually action and it is usually presented through a protagonist. But what really makes *True* escape reading is that the facts presented hardly ever touch the lives of its readers. The table of contents of a recent issue listed, among others, "Escape or Die" (an escape from a Japanese prison camp), "The

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Secret of the Sunken Battleships," "Africa's Biggest Rhino Hunt," "Shirleen of the Windmill Theater," "Three Wheels Are Enough" (for racing cars), "The Half-Pint Railroad They Wouldn't Let Die," "They Sure Outshot Us at Helsinki," and "Inside Scotland Yard."

War, big-game hunting, women, speed, sports, and crime—these are the ingredients of the men's magazines' glamorous "man's world," in which jobs, families, careers, education, and civic problems are never mentioned. But even more escapist than the facts themselves is the treatment of them. War here does not involve politics, economics, history, and culture; it is a background for individual exploit.

In "Escape or Die," the heroes are the classic protagonists of the adventure story, overcoming the usual unbelievable obstacles to reach a happy ending. That the story is true is important only because the fact of truth lends immediacy, and therefore shock appeal. At least the heroes of "Escape or Die" are Americans, and the reader's sympathy is assumed to be on the side of democracy. But pure adventure told with the objectivity of journalism can lead to strange conclusions. "The Secret of the Sunken Battleships" is also an adventure story told against the background of war, but it happens to be about the sinking during the last war of some of Britain's important warships by the Italian Navy. The protagonists, and therefore inescapably the "heroes," turn out to be Fascists.

More Fictitious Than Fiction

The true fact isolated from the truth may even be more fictitious than fiction. "The Half-Pint Railroad They Wouldn't Let Die" is about a true-enough retired salesman who runs a perfectly real 18½-mile railroad in North Carolina; but in the real world of giant corporation-run railways his is a fairy tale for all *True's* readers who like to tinker with their sons' model railroads and dream of being executives.

Similarly, the cataloguing of facts about the burlesque queen neatly hides the truth that she is the only kind of woman ever to be mentioned in most men's magazines, where women, like everything else, become simplified into mere objects of excitement. They are bodies, if not perfectly nude like Shirleen, bodies in bathing suits bending over swimming pools, bending over water fountains, or—as a last resort—just bending over.

When *True* does attempt to deal seriously with a complex subject, however, the results may be even more disastrous. In one issue it had Richard Tregaskis write about Switzerland, a nation that had successfully kept out of war. When the complexities had been reduced to their *True* proportions, it seemed that the Swiss had always kept themselves very well armed; ergo, if other countries followed suit, they too could stay out of war.

The Value of Violence

But the possibilities of this selective journalism are far more sensationally explored by *True's* numerous imitators. Bristling with tough titles—*Real, Male, Saga, Stag*—they are less concerned with facts about action than with action which may incidentally be fact. They are full of first-person adventure stories: "I Walked into a Bandit Death Trap," "Lost in the Everglades," "I Fixed Fights," "We Found Them Three Weeks Later." The material is no longer isolated fact but isolated excitement. This raises a serious problem for the publisher. Sheer shock in article after article, month after month, is hard to sustain. The readers' tastes become jaded. The only solution is to intensify the action into violence, the excitement into horror.

It is according to this logic that *Male* presents "Execution in Indo-China," a four-page picture spread showing the death before a firing squad of two Indo-Chinese terrorists. We are spared no detail: We see the men being tied blindfolded to stakes, the guns lifted, the bodies writhing, the corpses lying twisted in their pools of blood. For explanation we are then treated to a detailed verbal account of their crimes, which feature, of course, the methodical rape, torture, and murder of women. Neither, incidentally, is it any accident that the villains of the piece should be Asians and their victims and avengers Europeans.

ANOTHER and more shocking logic flows from the *True* formula. The purely journalistic approach to action and violence may completely ignore the ethical values usually demanded by fiction. The lead article in the March issue of *Real* is "Gun-Running Is My Racket." Interspersed in the faithful description of the mechanics of the profession are comments like these: "This is a risky way to make a living, but it is, at times, exciting, and, at all times, profitable. . . . We take no political sides—all we're interested in is the pay-off. . . . I, personally, don't get any particular kick out of being in this business, but I do know that if I don't sell the 'material' to the people who want it, someone else will. . . . The 'foreman' [of the gun-runners] . . . is as hardbitten as they come. . . . During the war he peddled nylons and Scotch. Believe it or not, he's a pretty honest guy—he's a steady husband and father . . . and he goes to church every Sunday."

What might have been a slight

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twinge in the consciences of *Real's* editors is dismissed at the end of this with a box headlined "Sometimes They Get Caught." It would probably be unmanly to record any other objections.

Argosy's New Rigging

Not all of the men's magazines, however, completely ignore the implications of their formula. In a different category is *Argosy*, one of the oldest periodicals in the country. *Argosy's* history is itself a history of popular publishing. It started seventy years ago as a children's magazine (printing the Horatio Alger stories) and has turned from pulp to slick, from children's to general to men's. Among its recent editors and contributors have been men like Merle Miller and Marion Hargrove.

Today *Argosy* might be described as a he-man with a conscience. It runs its share of the pure action stories: "I Sailed the Antarctic Killer Boats" (whale hunting), "Hop-Up" (automobiles), and even "My Run with the Tangiers Smugglers." But in the smuggling story the protagonist is not the smuggler (an ex-Nazi S.S. man) but the photographer who went along for the ride, and what is smuggled is not guns but medicines and nylons. There may not be much disapproval, but neither is the business made very exciting.

Argosy does not shrink from crime, but, rather than dwelling on the bloody details, features its "Court of Last Resort," in which mystery writer Erle Stanley Gardner, together with a battery of criminologists and lawyers, attempts to track down the truth about cases in which someone is thought to have been unjustly convicted.

A still more significant departure from *Real, Male,* and even *True* appears in an *Argosy* article about a "male" hero who is not satisfied with being a he-man. The article, "G.I. Lew" tells about Lew Jenkins, a former lightweight world champion who lost his love for the ring almost as soon as he acquired the title. This hero, who came from a family of Texas migratory workers, always fought best when he was the underdog. He found final satisfaction only in joining the infantry in Korea, not "to win a war or save a world, but just to be a part of that misery that is the private property of the front-line soldier."



Argosy's explanations of Jenkins are only tentative, and it attempts no generalizations. But in this article the solitary action hero has revealed his fatal flaw. For Jenkins, at least, the sheer physical excitement of the ring is not enough, the solely individual achievement is not satisfying. A man, even a man who is a great hero, wants at the end to feel some relationship to other men.

A similar uneasy unorthodoxy appears in *Argosy's* fiction. The situations, again, may be stock, but the characters have a new humanity. In the same issue which featured "G.I. Lew," the lead story was "Maloney's Last Stand." Maloney was a professional football hero who felt that he must justify his career by doing something very spectacular in his last game: "When a man's years had been given to something, it didn't matter what it was—a game or anything else—it was nice to have at the end the evidence that he had done it well, something big to complete his pact with the past."

The very choice of the hero at the end instead of the beginning of his career is meaningful; it begs a summing up. And although Maloney is triumphant, the story has overtones of sadness. What has he really done to complete his pact with the past? Once the excitement is over, what is left?

'Men on the Skids'

The same sad hero appears in the pages of *Esquire*. Here he is an aging baseball player who chooses to play his last game by consciously ruining



his failing arm in a spectacular display of pitching rather than allow his career to trickle off in mediocrity. The action hero is faced with another inexorable conclusion. To his fellow human beings in the stands he must forever be a miracle man. If he fails like other men, he is completely destroyed.

"Nearly all of my stories are about men on the skids!" says *Esquire* writer Barnaby Conrad in an interview in "Backstage with Esky." "I wonder why that is? I've never really thought about it." Mr. Conrad's story in this issue has no hero at all. Its protagonist is an idle, finicky old bachelor who has become increasingly aware that his life is meaningless. An enterprising nephew, eager to inherit his fortune, sends to his house a troop of acrobats who, after gaining entrance by a subterfuge, proceed to disrupt the routine of his life. As the nephew has guessed, order is the last thing left to the old man. Losing it, he is thrown into such panic that he cannot even get rid of the unwelcome visitors. Instead he gets rid of himself —with a noose.

Two other stories in the same issue of *Esquire* are also about self-destruction. One terrible one-pager, "The Cold Light," pursues its protagonist into despair after death. When the story opens he is already lying lifeless on the floor, but the horrified corpse discovers that although he cannot move he can still think. He is still aware of the sights and sounds of the world he has tried to escape altogether. The communicative corpse turns a strange, cold light on *Esquire's* cheery pages of fashions and cartoons!

For there is no escaping it. The "Esky" with the smooth yellow mus-

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tache and the bulging eyes is a very jaded playboy indeed. Whereas *Male's* hero might get lost in the Everglades angling from a rowboat, Esky will not venture into Long Island Sound without a perfectly outfitted little fishing yacht. Esky has Gayelord Hauser to advise him on his diet and a psychiatrist to soothe him about his fears. And while the admirers of *Real's* languorous hussies might give way to the low wolf whistle, one can imagine nothing from Esky, glancing at the overstylized chorus girls in the traditional cartoons, but a cynical smirk. Esky doesn't really believe in this man's world at all.



But if Esky mocks the he-man, *Gentry* does not even recognize him. In its fabulous world there are no fishing boats, and women exist only to fill out the picture of the man in the $150 sport jacket. Our hero here seems capable of nothing more energetic than spreading himself upon the sands of Palm Beach, where, if he chances to lift his head, he may notice Henry Ford II go by in the latest thing in silk shirts. And if Esky's suicide wants only to escape life, *Gentry* will do him one better with Albert Camus, who confesses from the wastes of Oran that it would suit him just fine if he could escape history.

Esquire and *Gentry*, of course, do not fit our "average" definition of the men's magazines. But they may be most important of all in explaining the sudden rise of the others. For they say most plainly what the *Reals* and the *Males* thunder to hide.

While their burlier, hairier-chested brothers have action and heroes without purpose, they, abandoning action, confess that they can discover no more heroes. Maybe their confusion is the same as that of the millions of American males who read the magazines month after month to reassure themselves that at least they are males.

Did Stalin's Death Change Anything?

GEORGE F. KENNAN

RUSSIA: WHAT NEXT?, by Isaac Deutscher. *Oxford University Press. $3.*

Four years ago Mr. Deutscher completed and published *Stalin: A Political Biography*, one of the few comprehensive studies of Stalin attempted by western scholars. The present volume, written in March and April of 1953, constitutes an epilogue to this biographic effort—an epilogue written under the immediate impact of Stalin's death and consisting largely of an analysis of the trends of Soviet society in the final period of Stalin's life and a forecast of what the coming period may bring to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Deutscher is not one of those who believe that the Soviet world is "immune to the laws of change to which the rest of this troubled world is subject." It is his view that in changing Russia as it has, Stalinism has eliminated some of the prerequisites for its own existence, and that for this reason it will not be possible for the new leaders of the Soviet Union to govern the Soviet Union entirely as it was governed in Stalin's lifetime.

Stalinism, in Mr. Deutscher's view, was something made possible, if not inevitable, by the state of Russian society as inherited from the czars and Lenin. But by governing as it did, "Stalinism has persistently and ruthlessly destroyed the soil in which it had grown, that primitive, semi-Asiatic society on whose sap it fed." By industrializing the Soviet territory, by urbanizing it, by revolutionizing its technology, by developing mass education, by collectivizing the peasant, by making the principle of economic planning an indispensable part of the lives of men, the Stalin régime—in Mr. Deutscher's view—created conditions in which pure Stalinism can no longer be a practical possibility.

Similarly, in the field of foreign affairs, the acquisition of a satellite area including China ("the vast realm of Stalinism that stretches from the Elbe to the Chinese Sea and is inhabited by nearly 800 million people") has thrown into question the very policy of isolationism, of "self-containment," that Mr. Deutscher considers Stalin to have followed.

Mr. Deutscher sees the immediate future in the Soviet Union as a period of transition necessary to enable Russia "to overcome her political numbness and to grow articulate again." Reform from above will be necessary; and Mr. Deutscher feels that the new rulers of the Soviet Union have shown signs of recognizing this necessity. But sooner or later the new economic and social forces created by Stalinism will break through; when they do, they will, as he sees it, probably assure the "democratic regeneration" of society, the gradual

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evolution of the régime toward a socialist democracy. The concomitant of this prospective internal revolution ought logically to be, he feels, a milder foreign policy, aimed at an easing of international tension as a prerequisite for the conduct of internal reform. This policy may be expected to aim at a reduction in the arms race and a new settlement of the problems of Korea, Germany, and Austria.

Assumptions and Absolutes

This view of Soviet society and its prospective evolution in the coming period is an extremely broad one, resting on a large number of more detailed judgments concerning the nature of Soviet society and its evolution to date. A few of these judgments are set forth and argued in the volume at hand, but more of them were elaborated in the earlier Stalin biography and appear in the present volume rather as postulates or assumptions which the reader is asked to accept. If these judgments are conceded, Mr. Deutscher's treatise flows with logic and plausibility. To the extent that they are not accepted, the entire structure of his thought comes into question.

In the field of Soviet studies it is dangerous for anyone to speak for any other than himself, and I can give no other than a personal view with respect to Mr. Deutscher's premises. It has long seemed to me that Mr. Deutscher and some other British students of Communism have inclined to two major misinterpretations, seriously misleading for anyone attempting to understand Soviet reality in the Stalin era.



George F. Kennan

The first of these misinterpretations is concerned with the nature of twentieth-century totalitarianism as it found expression in Germany and Russia. It is Mr. Deutscher's view that the machinery of terror, as evolved by the modern totalitarian state, is not immune to the effects of "the economic, social, cultural, psychological, and moral trends in a nation's life" but is dependent on these trends and on the political morale which flows from them. The political morale of a country, he feels, "can facilitate, obstruct, or, in an extreme case, even bring to a standstill the machinery of terror."

In matters of this sort it is probably well to avoid absolutes. Perhaps there could conceivably be situations in which what Mr. Deutscher says would have validity. But I think the majority of those students of modern totalitarianism who have known the phenomenon at first hand over long periods would be inclined to be skeptical about this and to feel that if the ruling group remains united, vigilant, and ruthless, it need not defer extensively to, or be seriously influenced by, subjective feelings within the populace at large.

The mass of the people can and unquestionably do experience change and evolution even in a totalitarian strait jacket. In the very long run, such changes probably do find a certain reflection in the development and attitudes of the régime; for the régime must draw new blood, in the last analysis, from the ranks of the people, and not every vestige of home training and local folklore can be expunged from the individual psychology even by the severe ideological discipline of the police state.

But there is usually a long interval between cause and effect. For all immediate purposes—in general, for the period of life expectancy of the average adult—all this has little actuality. The views and feelings of the average subject are not usually apt to influence his totalitarian masters within his time, unless the masters have selfish, one might say "institutional," reasons for taking account of them.



Isaac Deutscher

The subjective mood of the people becomes of compelling interest for totalitarian leaders only when popular apathy and despair reach a point where they begin seriously to affect labor productivity and where they can no longer be corrected by the usual combination of induced incentives and fears. But this is a point usually reached only under great physical hardship and exhaustion, and this situation can normally be averted or coped with by the selective distribution of food supplies, coupled sometimes with a few adroit and temporary concessions to popular feeling. In general, totalitarian leaders who retain their internal unity and their ruthlessness can scoff at subjective states of the popular mind and can comfort themselves with the reflection, once privately voiced by a prominent Soviet personality, that "people are sheep."

THE SECOND misapprehension is one relating specifically to the leaders of the Soviet Union. It speaks rather for the earnestness and idealism than for the worldly experience of Mr. Deutscher and some other Europeans that they have seemed inclined to view the Soviet leaders,

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even Stalin, as basically "nice people," determined social reformers, occasionally misguided, no doubt, capable at times of deplorable gaucheries and aberrations from right conduct, but well-meaning, well-tending folk withal, whose weaknesses one can understand and forgive, since the direction of their strivings is progressive and meritorious. Here again, I must confess to a contrary view.

I believe most historians would agree that every group of zealots which sets out to transform society in accordance with some utopian concept and which succeeds in seizing and exercising political power to this end soon finds itself, at least in some degree, beholden to the very powers it has acquired and, for the sake of the preservation of these powers, compelled to do things it had never originally dreamed of doing in the service of its utopian goals. This is, of course, a matter of degree. The question, in any given instance, can only be: How far did this process go? Did the compulsions involved in the exercise of power grow to such dimensions as to overshadow and render irrelevant the original utopian program, or was the modification not so great as to inhibit real progress in the desired direction?

I shall not attempt to discuss other historical instances. But it is my belief (and I think there are other students of Soviet affairs who would agree) that in the case of the Soviet Union the compulsions involved in the exercise and preservation of political power, both externally and internally, soon became the principal and overriding preoccupation of the



Soviet leaders, carrying them on to paths of action and habit that they themselves would have been free to recognize as criminal if the pretense of social reform had not been present as a rationalization.

It was these compulsions, not capitalist encirclement, that caused Stalin to retain the apparatus of terror for many long years after the theoretical social justification for it had passed. It was these compulsions that caused him to tear to pieces the older element of the very party to which he belonged, purging and killing its leaders and professional servants by the hundreds of thousands in the dark years of the 1930's.

It was these compulsions, not reformist zeal, that led Stalin to undertake the cruel and costly program of collectivization designed to give the régime sufficient control of the agricultural processes to assure the feeding of the cities and the army, even at the cost of a serious setback to agricultural productivity generally. It was these compulsions that caused him to insist that the Russian and other peoples of the Soviet Union, just emerging at the outset of this century into a fertile and exciting participation in the cultural currents of our time, should withdraw again into a cultural and personal isolation unparalleled even in Russia since the days of Peter the Great and wholly unknown to the experience of western civilization in all its history.

These considerations make it impossible for me to view the masters of the Kremlin in the Stalin era as primarily social reformers, and they leave me no choice but to see them as men who had involved themselves in a desperate human predicament, placing themselves on a pinnacle of autocratic power from which there was no safe retirement and where there was not even room for all of them at one time—where some could retain their position only by dislodging others in a process of pushing and gouging and killing that made a mockery of the pretense that they were elevating and dignifying human life. In the terrible story of these decades, the original brave professions of a desire to eliminate exploitation and injustice and to realize the aspirations of the common worker became the ironic slogans of a savage dictatorship—a taunt rather than a promise, the source of the anguished cry of the disillusioned revolutionary generation: *"Za shto borolis, tovarishchi?"*—"For what did we struggle, comrades?"

Hardening of the Bureaucracy

Where Mr. Deutscher's misapprehensions are allowed to prevail, it becomes impossible fully to accept his view either of the past or the future in Soviet affairs.

One can welcome Mr. Deutscher's insistence that the Soviet world is not immune to the laws of change. It is important that this be said and understood at this time in this country, for there are many Americans who see the structure of Soviet power only as a completed inhuman robot, unaffected by the inner weaknesses and limitations that have bedeviled all other wielders of power in earlier ages—as a ruling entity that has overcome all internal contradictions and can defy with impunity the laws of change and evolution. In such a distortion there reside dangers of interpretation more serious than those resident in Mr. Deutscher's relatively rosy and charitable outlook.

One can also agree with Mr. Deutscher that certain of Stalin's policies in the last years of his life produced changes that were indeed

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inconsistent with the indefinite continuation of the sort of rule he had himself practiced throughout most of his ascendancy. In other words, one can agree that Stalinism in its final years did begin to consume something of its own environment, in such a way that it would not be possible for Stalinism to proceed unchanged after Stalin's death.

But the point of difference would lie in the question as to where in the pattern of Soviet society these significant changes took place. Mr. Deutscher feels that it was in the habits and level of understanding of the people at large. I submit that the people have much less influence than Mr. Deutscher thinks, and that the significant changes produced by the policies of Stalin's last years took place within the régime itself, as distinct from the people.

In the 1930's, the secret of Stalin's rule lay in the maintenance of a state of artificial tension, uncertainty, and high mobility in all branches and echelons of the Soviet bureaucracy. This condition was intended to prevent the crystallization of any firm patterns of loyalty and solidarity among groups of officials, and thus to prevent the formation within the bureaucracy of vested interests capable of limiting the régime's freedom of action and of laying a claim to permanency and security of status. This result could be achieved only by a steady process of cruel playing off of subordinate against superior, of colleague against colleague, accompanied by the ruthless purging of the losers. The process was always a delicate and dangerous one, requiring great skill, coolness, and vigilance in the directing hand.

Mr. Deutscher correctly notes that in the final years of Stalin's power this process declined and the purging became relatively mild and perfunctory, a shadow of its former self. This was no doubt due to the falling off in Stalin's own health and vigor and to his reluctance, up to the end of his life, to delegate this delicate responsibility entirely to other men. The result is that there have been signs of a certain solidification of relationships in the Soviet bureaucracy. A sense of status seems to have begun to assert itself; children seem to have begun to relate their own rightful position to the more stable and enduring situations of their parents. Such developments are indeed inconsistent with the continued exercise of an uninhibited personal despotism such as Stalinism represented in its heyday. They are the mark of the traditional evolution of this sort of despotism into the more stable and familiar patterns of a caste-borne oligarchy.

But whether all this has anything to do with the populace at large seems questionable to me. One wonders whether, as so often before in Russian history, the people, disillusioned with the political power but respectful of its ruthless determination, are not going their own way emotionally and intellectually – a great, dreaming, unorganized human colossus, mute and unprotesting, submitting to what it would be folly to resist, guarding only in a latent state the formidable powers for social expression we know they possess.

How Important Is Malenkov?

So much for the general tenor of Mr. Deutscher's treatise. As a postscript, it might be said that many readers may be somewhat nonplused by Mr. Deutscher's treatment of Malenkov's position after Stalin's death. In the early portion of the work it seems to be assumed as self-evident that Malenkov has succeeded to Stalin's position and is the dominant personality in the post-Stalin régime. Deutscher refers to him flatly on page 16 as "Stalin's immediate successor"; further passages deal with "Malenkov's government," "Malenkov's first moves," what Malenkov "intends" to do, etc. Toward the end of the volume, however, a note of doubt is introduced: "Contrary to expectation, Malenkov has not 'stepped into Stalin's shoes.' At the top, government by committee has taken the place of government by a single leader."

Possibly this apparent discrepancy is the result of the fact that new evidence was becoming available as this book was being written. If so, this would bring into doubt the desirability of undertaking at so early a date so broad an analysis of the prospects of developments in Russia in the post-Stalin era. In any case, let it be said that on the basis of evidence available on this side of the Atlantic there is no reason to assume that Malenkov has yet succeeded to Stalin's position or is anything more than one member of a triumvirate in which Lavrenti Beria and Vyacheslav Molotov enjoy formidable institutional support within the apparatus of power.

In conclusion, it should be said that Mr. Deutscher's latest book, like his earlier ones, is excellently written and highly readable, and that it represents a serious and stimulating contribution to the study of a subject whose importance for western civilization is greater than most Westerners imagine.

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Russia's Future Strength: A Balance of Forecasts

HARRY SCHWARTZ

SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH, edited by Abram Bergson. *Row, Peterson & Co.* $6.

MAY 25, 1952, was the sort of Sunday that occasions deep gloom among the proprietors of resort hotels, golf courses, and similar establishments. A drenching rain inundated New York City and the neighboring Catskills, turning the dirt roads of the mountains into quagmires. On that morning two Soviet citizens, reporters for Moscow's Tass News Agency, found it necessary to leave the comforts of their Manhattan apartments and drive over the mountain roads to Arden House, perched high on a hill not far from West Point.

The event that induced this pair to display such Stakhanovite fortitude was a press conference marking the end of a scholarly meeting. How little this event excited American newspaper editors may be judged from the fact that only three non-Soviet reporters showed up. During the three-day Conference on Soviet Economic Growth, about thirty leading American students of the U.S.S.R.'s economic strength had sought to divine how powerful the Soviet colossus might be by 1970. A number of key United States government agencies considered the event important enough for them to send observers who sat through the entire meeting taking copious notes.



All that the Tass representatives received on that rainy Sunday was brief summaries of the major papers, but we can be sure that they or other Kremlin representatives will forward to Moscow several copies of the book reviewed here, which contains all of the material presented at the conference.

It would be a great pity if only Kremlin analysts read the book, for the information it contains is of the most vital importance to Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn. Though its conclusions are hedged about by the usual scholarly cautions and qualifications and clouded by some disagreement among the experts, it is to be hoped that such leaders as President Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Wilson receive more than a one-page summary of them.

THEODORE H. WHITE recently reported in this magazine (May 26) that certain European economists, after studying Soviet economic potentialities, had taken fright at what they found. Assuming that Soviet production goals for 1955 in the current Five-Year Plan would be attained, these economists projected past Soviet growth trends into the future and evoked a vision of Russia

some day enjoying a better standard of living than western Europe.

If these economists read *Soviet Economic Growth,* it is unlikely that all their fright will be assuaged. In some respects it might be heightened. But it is unlikely that they would repeat the same statistical flights of fancy or continue to regard the forecasting problem as such a simple one.

There are many reasons why the question of future Soviet economic growth is complex. Not least among these reasons is our great ignorance about many basic variables—an ignorance born both of Soviet secrecy and of the questionable accuracy of such data as Moscow has released. One example from this volume may illustrate the point: According to Soviet data, between 1928 and 1950 the physical volume of Russia's industrial production grew roughly thirteenfold, but an independent index compiled by Dr. Donald R. Hodgman suggests that the

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growth over this period was only half as rapid. Obviously, it makes quite a difference which of these two sets of data one uses. Other similar examples could be cited, and actually much of *Soviet Economic Growth* is concerned with illuminating hitherto dark aspects of the fundamental variables involved in any attempt at forecasting.

If we assume, as the contributors to this volume do, that there will be no major world conflict in the next two decades and that the Soviet Union will continue to be ruled by a régime that places high priority upon increased production, then to my mind three major conclusions emerge.

Riding the Curve

The first conclusion is that the continued rapid economic growth of the Soviet Union is inevitable, and that by 1970 the present gap between Soviet and American economic power will be narrowed considerably. The Soviet Union is still rich in raw materials; by 1970 its population should have grown to about 260 or 270 million; Soviet technology is now advanced enough to make substantial strides on its own and will undoubtedly continue, in so far as it is able to acquire and apply the fruits of foreign technological advance. Such rapid economic progress does not require that any greater proportion of the national income be diverted from consumption in the future than in the past, when there was an amazing similarity between U.S. and Soviet rates of investment.

How far can Soviet expansion go? To set an upper limit, Mr. Gregory Grossman discusses the possibility that by 1960 Soviet national output —roughly the total physical production of industry and agriculture— might be as much as twice as great as in 1950, while by 1970 it might be 3.5 to 3.9 times as great. If the latter figure is correct, Soviet production in 1970 will be quantitatively equal that of the United States in 1950, though because of the much greater Soviet population, per capita output would only be fifty-five to sixty per cent as great as it was here in 1950.

Professor Hodgman suggests that it may not be unreasonable to expect Soviet industrial output alone to be 4.5 times as high in 1970 as in 1950. It should be clear that these are not offered as flat predictions, but rather as indications of what a continuance of the present Soviet production curve suggests, even when allowance is made for exaggeration in Soviet statistics.

I would like to point out two major implications of this conclusion about rapid future economic growth:

The threat presented to the non-Soviet world by Soviet military capabilities will become ever greater, assuming the continuance of present international tension.

And as the total Soviet production increases, it should be possible for the Moscow rulers to continue expanding simultaneously the resources available for military production, investment, and consumption. Whether consumers will actually continue to get some of the benefits of this depends, of course, in large part upon how frenzied the arms race becomes.



Not So Fast, There!

I do not, however, share the fright of the European economists because I believe the second major conclusion suggested by the volume is that the future rate of Soviet economic expansion will probably be substantially *slower* than it was from 1928 to 1940

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

or from 1945 to date. Serious retarding factors are and will be making their influence felt on the speed of Soviet economic growth, and Mr. Grossman's suggestion that the Soviet national product in 1970 could be as great as this country's was in 1950 seems to me (as, indeed, it does to Mr. Grossman) highly improbable.

It may help to understand the nature and magnitude of these retarding factors if we glance briefly at some of the reasons for the rapid Soviet economic upsurge after 1928. In that year tens of millions of potential workers were idle or only partially employed, particularly in the farm areas. Living standards and real earnings were relatively high. Available facilities such as urban housing and the railroad system were being used at well below their peak capacity. Soviet industry was technologically very backward in its production methods and produced little or no quantities at all of many types of modern machinery, chemicals, metals, and the like. Soviet mineral resources, relatively speaking, were almost untouched.

It was by taking up this slack—and even going far beyond real slack—that the Soviet leaders were able to drive their economy ahead so rapidly. Within a few years millions of people were shifted from idleness or partial employment in agriculture to full-time factory work. The "fat" was cut out of living standards in the early 1930's as consumption was sacrificed to investment. Existing housing and railroad facilities were put to work more intensively than ever before in Soviet history, thus minimizing investment in these "nonproductive" facilities and permitting the bulk of investment to go into industry and agriculture, particularly into heavy industry. The most modern resources of technology were brought in from abroad, thus giving Russia in a decade the benefit of what it had cost western Europe and the United States half a century or more to develop at great labor and expense. The richest and most easily accessible mineral resources of the country—iron ore from Krivoi Rog and Magnitogorsk, coal from the Donbas and the Kuzbas, oil from Baku and the "Second Baku"—were taken from the earth to feed the new industry's needs. The Second World War cost Russia much, of course, but a great part of the loss could be made up from capital equipment received under Lend-Lease and the much greater volume of equipment taken from eastern Europe and Manchuria after the war.

TODAY much of this slack is gone from the economy, and with it much of the impetus which that slack provided initially. The industrial labor force cannot be increased in the future as rapidly as in the past. Few if any more people can be crammed into jam-packed Soviet housing. The



railroad system, more intensively used than any comparable system in the world, must receive much more capital investment. Soviet industry has attained a sufficiently high technological level so that it can no longer make the enormous gains that were possible when the U.S.S.R. was a far more backward country.

The greater size of Soviet capital plant means that depreciation and replacement must take more of current production than they did two decades or so ago. The ruthless exploitation of Krivoi Rog, Magnitogorsk, and the Donbas means that the quality of the coal and iron ore these great sources provide has declined, while mines have had to be dug deeper. At Magnitogorsk ore that was once considered too poor to be used is now being reclaimed from old waste piles, since what is being mined is often little if any better. All this means, too, that new sources of minerals from far out in Siberia or beyond the Arctic Circle have become ever more necessary, even though mining them and bringing them where they are needed involves great expenditure.

Malthus and Marx

What I consider the book's third major conclusion concerns the problem raised by Malthus a century and a half ago. Between 1953 and

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1970, the Soviet population will probably increase by as much as sixty million persons. The nation must increase its food production twenty-five per cent in this period just to keep pace with the population, yet in the same period the government is committed to improving the quality of the Soviet diet—that is, less grain, more meat or similar high-protein foods. Yet Russia's agricultural resources are very sharply limited and there is relatively little good virgin farmland.

One way out of this dilemma, of course, is to raise the relatively low yields of existing cropland. More farm machinery can help a little here, but much more important are the roles of irrigation, fertilizers, afforestation, and draining of swampland. The Soviet government's awareness of this problem is evidenced by its recent much-publicized projects in these directions. But afforestation will require many years for any significant effect, and the area affected by present irrigation and land-drainage projects is a small fraction of the total Soviet crop area.

Professor George B. Cressey has summed up the darkness of the outlook on this problem by saying simply: ". . . the 200 million people of the Soviet Union and their descendants can never be as well fed as the 150 million citizens of the United States." "Never" is a long time, but for the foreseeable future there seems little reason to doubt the basic truth of Professor Cressey's statement or to minimize the increasingly severe problem that food will be to the Soviet régime.

THUS it seems that we can envisage the Soviet Union's future neither as a period of utopian abundance nor as one in which the abysmal poverty of the past or present need prevail. The Kremlin should be capable of improving its people's living standards somewhat while it continues to offer an ever greater military threat to the outside world. If future progress is likely to be slower than in the past, it will still be progress. To help solve its growing food problem in the next decades, Russia may enter world markets to trade its industrial produce for wheat and meat. If the satellite Danube Basin can again become a major food exporter, that may help alleviate the difficulty. If not, the rulers of the U.S.S.R. may be tempted to ponder whether their military-economic strength might not be used to execute more effectively the kind of imperialist policy that a much weaker Japan pursued for somewhat similar reasons two decades ago.

CHANNELS:

News Heard, News Seen

MARYA MANNES

WHAT is news? A collection of facts relating to the events of the day and the moment, now available to us in print, in sound, and, most recently of all, in sight.

So far the most potent means of transmission of news has been sound. Millions now hear the facts without bothering to read them in print, and they can hear them in a dozen different ways. They can tune in to hourly AP and UP reports read aloud by a man whose level emphasis indicates that he is concerned with neither substance nor significance. They can hear the same reports read by a professional announcer who speaks of the Korean truce with the same oleaginous affability he bestows on Kreml. They can hear the events of the day selected, integrated, and analyzed by a mature and trenchant mind. And they can hear the same events distorted into bias and slander by a megalomaniac, a ham, or a rabblerouser. Because it provides this range and profusion, radio still has a news hegemony. A citizen of a major city can listen to news a hundred times a day if he so wishes. On television he can see only a fifth as much. The partisans of radio contend, moreover, that what he sees is much less than what he hears—a sacrifice of coverage to the novelty of sight—and that the expense and complexity of televising news are still highly disproportionate to the effects achieved.

Up to a point, the preparation of radio and TV newscasts is the same. The newscaster himself examines the AP, UP, and INS tapes of the day and hour; reads the most complete local newspaper; selects and assembles his material according to its current importance, opening with the lead story and ending with the baseball scores or an escaped chimpanzee.

The routine newscaster then need only keep his eyes on incoming news items up to the time he goes on the air. The commentator—a man such as Eric Sevareid, Elmer Davis, or Martin Agronsky—must do a considered piece of writing in that period, for he is concerned not alone with news reports but with their meaning and impact, and his presentation of these is as important as the facts themselves.

BUT THE TRIALS of a TV newsman begin after the initial news collection. Douglas Edwards, for instance, must sit in conference with his director, Don Hewitt; the news editor; the art editor; the film editor; and several others to decide exactly where, how, and when visual material is to be inserted into the body of his telecast. After the latest great atom explosion, for instance: "Is the fireball worth thirty seconds—fifty

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seconds—a minute? How much do people want?" "Cut it to fifty for the blast" ". . . follow with the jets."

Put in this, take out that. Is Wiley worth—is the game worth—commercial here—one minute—twenty-five seconds—weighing, balancing, arguing, with the last word usually the newscaster's. And the films keep coming in while they talk—a 16-mm. of a flood in Oregon; a 35-mm. of Adenauer from Frankfurt; a sequence of Rodney, the surviving Siamese twin. Then, if something really big breaks before air time, throw out the old and throw in the new.

The men in television are convinced that these labors, expensive as they are, and the electronic hopes of the future will ultimately make their medium preferred in the field of information as it is in that of entertainment, and they can cite some evidence to back them up. The two major news shows on TV—"Douglas Edwards and the News" at 7:30 (Eastern Daylight Time) nightly and "The Camel News Caravan," with John Cameron Swayze on NBC at 7:45 have now crept into over four million homes. If, as the TV men believe (and the Coronation performance confirms it), these millions will eventually be able to see the events of the world as they are happening, whether it be a fire in Houston, a riot in Caracas, or a ball in Paris, than sightless news will have lost its appeal.

They may be right. There is a strong fascination in being a witness to events. The object seen should be the ultimate in objectivity. The viewer himself then ought to become analyst, commentator, and judge.

IN PRESENT terms, however, the newscaster on TV is still the star of the program and the root of the trouble. Whatever he does—sitting behind a desk, sitting on it, posing full face or three-quarters, backed by skyscrapers or maps or stars—the announcer on television remains an awkward, one might even say superfluous, factor. To those who need reassurance, pleasant and open faces like Edwards's or Swayze's may give the news extra credibility or even palatability, much as Dick Stark's visible personality on TV is a seal of approval on the cigarette he sells. But in those concerned with the fact itself, the television newscast is—to put it bluntly—boring. They will still turn to their radios if they want the latest from Washington, from Rome, or from Korea, and whether they want it straight and fast or from the man in whose mind they find the reflections of truth.

On radio you can still find a Sevareid, a Davis, an Agronsky, and Edward R. Murrow at their fullest range. Paradoxically, there is no loss of personality in the blind world of radio. On the contrary, intellectual honesty, courage, and sensibility are implicit in the chosen and spoken word, as are, equally, spite, rancor, and rhetoric. It might even be that the destructive qualities are too explicit on television, and maybe that is why some of the more violent radio pundits find it unwise to be seen. Hate may be exciting to feel, but it can be frightening to look at.

It is doubtful whether much could be gained, on the other hand, by making such men as Sevareid, Davis, and Agronsky visible as well as audible. Murrow has made the jump with great success, but "See It Now" is more of a documentary than a newscast, and more film than Murrow, handsome as he is.

POSSIBLY the great commentators will follow Murrow, using their superior knowledge and judgment in the selection of visual material. Possibly it is imperative that they do. For the "objectivity" of the object could prove the ultimate deception of a public already confused more than it knows by slanted news and incomplete reporting. By selection and omission it is as easy to detort a filmed story as a written or spoken story, and if you're clever at picking your shots you can show a good man in the attitudes of a fool and a fool in the attitudes of a hero.



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

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